Category Archives: Democracy
Israeli Nationalist Legislation and Democracy
Even the staunchest defender of Israel is troubled by the approval of undemocratic laws designed to maintain the Jewish nature of the state. For some time now nationalists have been challenging the good nature of Israel’s democracy by passing laws that restrict the rights of the minority community, namely Arabs, from expressing themselves even symbolically. Here are a few examples: Israel’s war of independence in 1948 is called the Nakba or the disaster by the Arabs and it is against the law to use state funds to commemorate the Nakba. Small communities have been empowered to prevent groups from moving into the community. Some have suggested loyalty oaths and there have been laws passed that prevent Palestinian citizens from seeking rights in the courts.
Many of these laws are objectionable to most Israelis and have been rejected by the Knesset. But a certain number of them appeal to a wide variety of people. Israelis fear the loss of the Jewish particularity of the state and even though they struggle with these laws some argue for their necessity. One Israeli leader even proposed legislation that suggested the superiority of the Jewish nature of the state over the democratic nature of the state, and this included rejecting Arabic as a national language in Israel.
What motivates this sort of action? There are a few prime motivators the most important of which is the essential Jewish nature of the state. Israel simply cannot be a strong liberal democracy and privilege Jewish particularity. It’s a contradiction in terms on one level. But on another level Israel has a right to remain Jewish. There is a sense in which the state of Israel makes no sense if it is not Jewish. The question is how Jewish? The answer lies somewhere betweenIsraelas a Torah state sealed in orthodoxy, and Israel as a secular democratic state with the separation of church and state. The balance between the Democratic and the Jewish nature of the state will have to evolve over time.
But there are other causes which include a failed peace process, a public tired of violence and rocket attacks, and the distasteful experience of watching Israeli Arabs cheer Hezbollah rockets. Increasingly Israelis see all Palestinians, even Israeli Palestinians, as the same and do not assume that Israeli Palestinians have any commitment to the state.
Of course, one answer to this reactionary legislation is the two-state solution. But that does not seem to be something bound for the near future; moreover, even with the establishment of a Palestinian state there will be a sizable Palestinian minority in Israel proper. This problem will not go away. This sort of reactionary legislation will not go away but it is more exposed than ever because it promises to threaten the democratic nature ofIsrael. Threats to free speech and the disempowerment of whole groups of people have placed the problem at the forefront of the public’s consciousness. Israeli Arabs are about 20% of the Israeli population and the number is simply too big to ignore.
Israel should guarantee the symbolic rights of all minority groups. The key word here is symbolic rights, the rights to express themselves through protest and the right to propose alternative perspectives on the state. Any culture has a right to protect itself from a genuine threat and Israelis no different. In the same way that the skinheads were allowed to march in the United States, as long as they were not judged to be overly provocative or violent, minority groups inIsraelshould also be allowed to express themselves through acceptable forms of protest. Protected speech is sacred to liberal democracies and, as the observation goes, the best response to unpleasant speech is more speech. Israel should have nothing to fear from the rights of Palestinians to express themselves – again, the right to express themselves peacefully and under conditions that do not promote imminent danger. Stubborn resistance to the rights of Palestinians will only cause the conflict to spiral downward and make the two-state solution even more difficult to achieve.
What We Are Learning from the “Arab Spring”
It is sensible to ask what recent events generally termed the “Arab Spring” mean. That is, even if we identify winners and losers and good things and bad things is it more than a parlor game. One wit took umbrage at the term “Arab Spring” because everybody knows that there are only two seasons in the Arab world neither one of which is Spring. It’s always an easy and correct copout to say it’s too early to know, and indeed there are numerous strategic and political implications yet to be realized. But it remains true that leaders have been driven from four Arab countries – Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia – and there is nothing insignificant about this. Syria is teetering on the brink while others – Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon – have been influenced by the uprisings. As easy as it is to make a case in either direction I believe there are four trends, some of them positive but not all, to the events of the past year.
1. The people have spoken and are energized. It was common knowledge that most political action in Arab regimes was among the elites. That it was the elites who determined the future and set the agenda. The influence of popular will was considered minimal and easy to ignore. With strong military influences and authoritarian traditions the voices from the streets were easy to hold down. Tahrir square showed that this was no longer the case. Clearly a rational deliberative democracy is not going to break out in Egypt anytime soon, but there has been a power shift toward popular voices.
2. Popular will and democratic voices have unleashed support for the Muslim Brotherhood. The future will see the emergence of an Iranian presence and a developing role for political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed in Egypt and held at bay for decades – now they hold electoral power. It’s possible that the Muslim Brotherhood could be considered an antidote to Al Qaeda, a softening of the Al Qaeda message because the Brotherhood must deal with the practical political issues of the population. But it is also the case that the Muslim Brotherhood will produce increasing anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric, not to mention a stubborn and difficult relationship with Israel. The last thing Egypt needs is a war with Israel and troubles along the border with the Gaza Strip. But it’s difficult to imagine the parliamentary power of the Muslim Brotherhood making life easier for Israel.
3. The American foreign-policy position will have to do business with the Muslim Brotherhood and religious oriented political parties. The United States will simply have to reconcile itself to Islamist dominated parties in Arab countries. The US still makes the mistake of believing that elections are the most important facet of democracy. We still have not internalized that when you are “in for a dime you are in for a dollar.” In other words, if we support open and free elections then you must be able to live with the results. Ideally, democracy building starts with institutions and habits of the mind before elections. But on the other hand political Islam is in its infancy stages and will, I believe, be one of the most interesting political theory developments in the future. If Western countries can play a role in this development, then so much the better for the future of international relations.
4. Finally, I have been surprised by the behavior of the Saudi’s. For most of their history they have been a rich and politically lazy society that did little more than produce oil and religion topped off with a dollop of authoritarianism. Moreover, the basis of much of their foreign-policy has been simply to buy off enemies and do what is ever necessary for their own self-preservation. They seem to be continuing down this path and have little regard for the promotion of any sorts of freedom or rights for their own people. Their assignment of military forces to Bahrain was designed to squash any hint of liberal democracy and to make a statement that they were not could allow such dalliances in their neighborhood.
There remains plenty of political and social forces that will shape the post-Mubarak Egypt as well as other “Arab Spring” countries. Hopefully, the spirit of Tahrir square, with its sense of social solidarity, will continue.
The Three Products of Saudi Arabia – God, Oil, and Security
Change is coming to the Middle East in the form of the “Arab Spring.” At least that is what we keep hearing about. An immolation in Tunisia, a corrupt leader in Egypt, and an oppressive Syrian state are all crumbling under the weight of non-viable political systems. Successful democracies are a pipedream in many countries but the creaking in clanking of structural change continues. One country seems to be immune from these changes and has found a package of promises that continues to satisfy citizens.
Saudi Arabia, as a protection against social upheaval, has handed out billions of dollars in economic aid in order to head off discontent. It remains the case that many Saudi citizens are frustrated about unemployment, housing, and health services but the economic handouts have softened the blow. But there is nothing so strong, nothing that cements a society more than religious coherence and the successful spreading of obligation. The Saudi leaders, their voices ringing out from the minarets and mosques, regularly remind their people of their godly duties, which include allegiance to the house of Saud. The message is clear: the present Saudi leaders have returned civil obedience and purity to the land by reminding the people of their obligation to God. They warn the country against chaos and glorify themselves as the voice of Islam. The rhetorical strategy is very effective. Any call for demonstrations or suggestion of civil disobedience is characterized as a conspiracy and as a violation against Islam.
The Saudis also use the Sunni-Shia divide as a weapon in their cold war against Iran. They are convinced that Iran wants to increase its penetration into other societies and see the Arab spring as an opportunity for Iranian influence. The Iranians on the other hand have tried to use pro-democracy movements to advance their own position, even though their intentions may be less than honorable. Saudi anti-Shiite religious traditions are an effective policy against Iran and other threatening countries.
When the bonds of religious commitment loosen and citizens begin to ask questions and engage in debate and challenge conventional wisdom, the Saudis deploy their third foreign-policy strategy which is to tighten security. If God and oil are not enough, then security must be.
A group of activists called for a “digital day of rage” in Saudi Arabia and the goal was to gather momentum for democratic processes in the underground digital world. But above ground, in the real world, Saudi security forces were repelling the few demonstrators that showed up for the day of rage. A few petitions were passed around but to no avail and the Saudi government responded by invoking criminalization of any criticism of the King.
These three strategies of God, oil, and security are working fairly well for the Saudi’s at the moment. So far anyway, they have held off the weather by pushing back the Arab spring. To the credit of protesters looking for more individual freedom they have maintained their digital activism. The underground web networks are serving an important function to a population denied most basic freedoms. The Saudi leadership will have none of it. They continue to use oil money and religious doctrine to prevent protest. Democracy advocates have a difficult path ahead of them. They must face a wealthy government that tailors economic payoffs that would make Tony Soprano blush with envy. Tight security and an aggressive police force certainly cause citizens to think twice about real protest.
The prospect for revolt in Saudi Arabia is slim. The structural conditions do not exist to stimulate real mobilization and real protest. It is not a society that has developed trade unions, activist student populations, or other protest movements that can possibly play a role in leading revolt. Moreover, because of oil money most Saudi citizens do not suffer economic deprivation. So the cycle continues – security protects the oil money which is anointed by God.
Now Is the Time to Watch Egypt
If there were a moment in time when I was going to pay particular attention to what’s going on in Egypt, and trying to predict how its future will develop, it would be now. It’s a Monster’s Ball and the only couple dancing is the military and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). I and others have been warning about the coming Islamic tide and what happens in the next few weeks could be the deciding factor. The elections are today. The public and the protesters in Tahrir square seem to have strong democratic impulses coursing through their veins. They are calling for the military to leave power, civilian control of the military, and limitations on the MB. At the moment, the military seems to be the biggest problem. They have tried to assign themselves special powers and protections under a Constitution including refusing civilian control of the military. How far beyond high school civics does one need to go before they understand the importance of civilian control of the military? Violence against protesters must cease, and security must come under clear civilian rule.
Both the MB and the military are naturally conservative and hierarchical. If Egypt is not careful they will end up with some version of Saudi Arabia – religious conservatism and authoritarian politics. The Central Security Forces have overreacted when trying to clear some protesters and incurred the wrath of many. The protesters have reason to be fearful. The military has been particularly recalcitrant and difficult mostly because they believe they have the support of the Egyptian people, but that support is waning. The military’s attempt to grab sweeping powers and maintain independence above the law is inconsistent with the Arab Spring. Still, the Egyptian “silent majority” may make it possible for the military to prevail. The protesters may have the strongest democratic impulses but their numbers are exaggerated by media coverage.
The MB clearly holds the upper hand and is easily the most influential political party. Their new Freedom and Justice party is well organized and financed and ready to reap gains stimulated by the brotherhood’s outreach and efficient organization. The MB can certainly be hierarchical and conservative but Islam is woven into the fabric of Egyptian society and no future state can ignore it. The brotherhood wants quick elections so that they can consolidate their strengths and begin to work on the nature and structure of the new constitution.
But the future of Egypt will not be represented by the military or the Central Security Forces and certainly not by a dominant controlling Muslim party. If the birth pangs of a new Egypt in Tahrir square are going to bring forth anything viable, than the protesters and the liberal political parties must have sufficient influence when writing a new constitution. The liberal parties want the military to delegate decision-making and to establish a temporary civilian government whose job it will be to put itself out of business; that is, the temporary civilian government will be charged with maintaining order and beginning the process of transitioning to the permanent government.
The structure of today’s elections is one problem. Many liberal voices will be drowned out by the rules of the elections. Groups representing women and minority rights have been pushed to the background and election officials in Egypt have denied the United Nations and other groups access to the election that could help guarantee fairness. The party list technique will mean that smaller groups such as Coptic Christians and liberals will be overwhelmed by larger groups such as the MB. Even smaller Islamic parties, which are often more liberal, will be silenced. Moreover the election reserves a certain number of seats for “workers and farmers” which means that even if smaller more liberal groups managed to win elections they could be sidelined because their seats are guaranteed to other constituencies. This is an election manipulation that has been used in the past to manipulate results.
American historians often point out that the period after the American Revolution is most important because that is when the infrastructure and foundation of America was established. Revolutions are quick, violent, and ideologically eruptive but the legislative processes that follow determine the true nature of the political culture. The same will be true in Egypt. Keep your eye on what is happening now.
Muslim Election Implications
A few posts ago I predicted, along with others, a coming Muslim empire in the Middle East. The early signs are pretty supportive of this prediction. I don’t want to be naïve and appear as if Islam will play no role in governing Middle East countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya. Islam is a significant cultural category in this area of the world and responsible for the identity of many of the citizens. But even at the risk of sounding alarmist we need to keep our eye on the triumph of Islam in the political process of many states.
We are supposed to be seeing the beginning of democracies in places like Tunisia and Egypt, but such a transition is by no means assured given the results of elections. In Tunisia the Islamist party, Nahda, may present itself as a roadblock to Tunisia’s recently gained freedoms. We might expect Tunisia’s largest Islamic political party to do well in an election, but it still raises worries about the future and whether or not the modern and secular Tunisia will remain that way.
There are instances of Nahda’s founder insisting that the rights of women and others would be respected but then appealing to more religiously conservative members of the electorate. The party is a relative of the Muslim brotherhood with the documented message of radicalism that sometimes contradicts the moderate message.
We are beginning to see a trend in the discourse emerging from many media and academic critics that condemns any declarations of Islam as extremist. It’s becoming the case that if one expresses fear of revolutionary Islam, they’re accused of alarmism at the least and fear mongering at the worst. And even though I do not want to contribute to either, we are seeing the beginning of the Muslim empire I have referred to and the conditions for slipping into revolutionary Islam are delicate. It is the dominant ideology in Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, and Libya, and cannot help but find its way into the political system. There are three interesting links between Islamists and their success in the coming Muslim majority.
The first was a failure of Arab nationalism. When the military took over Egypt in the early 1950s there was the possibility that nationalism would govern as the dominant political ideology in the region. But after economic failures, war losses, and general threats to their identity the nationalist failed to convince a population that they had anything to offer. Waiting patiently in the wings was the Muslim Brotherhood.
Political skill and manipulation, almost in the tradition of American electoral campaigns, is a second reason for the rise of Islam. Increasingly, political leaders express messages of modernity and moderation but behave more extremely. One Muslim brotherhood leader stated that he was more interested in elections than the work of bin Laden because elections were easily winnable. The brotherhood has learned the public relations methods of the West and this has resulted in their claims as victims and oppressed by imperialism, racism, religious intolerance, and Zionism. Note the sympathetic stance toward Palestinians and international condemnation of Israel – a strong democracy trying to defend itself.
And third, American confusions and misplaced international policies have too often humiliated and misunderstood Islamist groups. Even given the oft cited number of times we have defended Muslims (Bosnia, Kuwait, attempts to rid Iraq of oppressive leaders) the US and Western powers have failed to make the case.
There is a tide. The once banned resistance party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and The National Transitional Council in Libya have all declared support for Shariah law. Perhaps some of these religious campaign strategies are designed to appeal to an electorate and will moderate in the future. Tunisia is an excellent test case. It is far more impressive democratically and economically than many other states. It has a high rate of female literacy and a strong national identity. It was the first to overthrow an autocratic leader and demand democratic rights. Let’s hope that the election of an Islamist political party does not roll back the progress made by Tunisians.
Will Jihadist Islam Give Way to Democracy?
The prospect for democracy in the
Islamic world is currently an energized debate that has interesting political,
religious, and practical consequences. One perspective on the problem is most
represented by the noted political theorist Samuel Huntington. Huntington was
blunt about the fact that democracy was quite incompatible with the Muslim
world. He argued that the Muslim world lacks the preconditions for a transition
to democracy. His very popular book, The
Clash of Civilizations, was at least indirectly informed by a pessimism
about democracy and Islam. Islam lacked, according to Huntington, key concepts
such as popular sovereignty, human rights, and market economies.
But the problem with this perspective is
that it is short term. Moreover, this sort of pessimism about democracy and
Islam is overly influenced by current conditions of fundamentalism, fueled by
Al Qaeda, or “Islamism.” In fact, there is another way to think about
the issue. If one simply makes a direct comparison between doctrinal issues in
Islamism and democracy, then Islam will not compare favorably. Islamism in its
current extreme form is antithetical to any idea of democracy. But it is
possible to take different theoretical perspective – one that involves a longer
view of history and looks more to social and economic conditions rather than
doctrinal principles. It is possible to argue that the actual content of Islam
is less important than the conditions that give rise to it.
Michael Walzer, the noted political
philosopher, makes a very interesting argument based on his book from the 1960s
on the origins of radical politics. Walzer argues that radicals (read modern-day
Jihadists) emerge during periods of social dislocation. When societies are confused
about how to organize themselves, when they are confronting change and
transitions that require new ways of thinking and behaving, is when conditions
are ripe for the emergence of radicals, especially those that seek purity and a
return to discipline and order. The radical ideology subsides when peace and
calm are restored.
Walzer points out that the road to
radicalism begins with an individual or group that views themselves as chosen;
this chosen group is characterized by certainty and confidence; their
relationship with the rest of the world is warlike and they turn toward their
internal cohesion with testimonies of formal commitment. The chosen band sees
itself as a saint and free to propose new political organizations. The saints, as
Walzer terms them, carry people through a time of change and offer a form of
stability.
The parallels with Islamic
fundamentalism are easy to recognize in terms of the revolutionary content of
jihadist ideology, its transformative message, and the social origins of its adherents.
If the analysis is correct and has any traction at all there should be in the
future an evolution away from jihadism. Other scholars have made the argument
that modern-day fundamentalists are a departure from Islamic historical and
political conditions. And over time the counter reaction to Islamism will be
what ushers in liberalizing influences. Finally, if it is true that social
conditions are more important than the content of ideology, then perhaps
political theorists and social scientists can figure out ways to nudge history
along.
Islam Is Vertical, Democracy Is Horizontal: Can They Be Reconciled?
Just how much democratic air the Arab Spring
ushers in remains to be seen. The large tent of Islam is beckoning its
followers from around the world to begin building the Islamic state.
Dictatorial rule such as that in Egypt has overshadowed religious activities
for many years, and questions about how to apply the principles of Islam to
society have gone unanswered. In some places the word “Islamist” is
being shunned for more inclusive language. In other places traditionalists are
trying to strictly apply Islamist ideas to the government – ideas such as
obligatory religious taxes, heavy censorship, and conservative treatment of
women. The future will grapple with the demands of the community versus the
demands of Islam, but the struggle will not be between Islam and secularism but
rather between more Islam and less Islam.
One way to pose the problem of religion
and the state is to clarify that religion is vertical with God at the top and
humans beneath. The relationship is one of the individual as the relatively passive
recipient of truth or orthodoxy. Democracy is horizontal where regardless of
race, religion, or creed there is an equality of rights and equal treatment
under the law. Problems arise when the horizontal and vertical axes get
confused or encroach on one another’s space such that the principles of the God
are applied to the horizontal relationships among equals in a society. In the
horizontal world of democracy and the secular state the moral foundation of
political authority rests with popular sovereignty. Democracy is degraded and
diminished when the moral foundation shifts to the vertical axis and relies on
a particularly authoritative God. This is why democracy theorists insist on the
separation of religion and state.
The two axes emerge from very different
conditions of governance. The horizontal liberal democratic process makes
decisions and comes to truth through contestatory discourse. The assumption is
that differences between people are given and problems are solved and reconciled
through the communication process, which regulates beliefs and attitudes. The
primary mode of managing differences is persuasion or the strength of the
better argument. Issues such as tolerance, pluralism, compromise,
inclusiveness, and argument are central to liberal democratic politics. The
vertical axis, on the other hand, backgrounds contestatory discourse and relies
more on proclamations from authority.
There are additional reasons why we
should work to influence liberal democratic processes and limit the power of
the Islamic state. These include the fact that religion is exclusionary and
sets up boundaries and distances between believers and nonbelievers. This
exacerbates the conditions for conflict. The horizontal democratic state, which
is based on membership in a political society rather than a religious one,
emphasizes more what people have in common than their differences. This shared
identity, this strain toward commonality is a well-established mark of low
conflict societies. After all, it could be the case that 100% of the women in society
cover their heads but of what value is this to even the most religious person
if the state is characterized by corruption and nothing works.
Additionally, religion undermines
democratic peace. It seeks to dissipate the differences between the axes and
move God to the center of debate. Still, it’s important to work toward perhaps
some compatibility between Islam and the liberal democratic state if for no
other reason than it is unavoidable. In fact, if there can be some democratic consensus
as to the role of religion in the state then the long-term prospects for the
political system are improved. In the case of Islam it is probably prudent to
recognize a few realities:
One, it may be possible to redefine what
it means to be secular. Nader Hashemi writing in, Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy, explains that there is
not even really a word for “secularism” in classical Arabic, Farsi,
or Turkish that is synonymous with the English term. Hence the term is ripe for
expansion and semantic development.
Second, it is impossible to avoid Islam
because it is so central to the culture and hence liberal democracies cannot
avoid incorporating religious politics. True, religion and democracy are
typically considered antithetical but any intersections of commonality and
mutuality have not been explored. Christianity is typically invoked as a
positive force in the development of Western liberalism so perhaps the same can
be true of Islam the differences between Christianity and Islam
notwithstanding.
Finally, religion has a history in the
public sphere that has been underappreciated by democrats. Religion does not
have to be completely rejected or privatized but it does have to be properly
interpreted. All of these issues provide for the possibility of a healthy
incorporation of Islam into a democratic culture. And even though Western
democratic theorists would like to see the horizontal and vertical lines remain
counter to one another, it’s important that future Arab states making transitions
to democratic processes remain practical with respect to the role of religion.
Otherwise the entire structure is in jeopardy.
The Coming Islamic Empire
Let me describe a few realities and you
tell me the common explanatory factor. First, the Israeli Embassy in Cairo is attacked
and the Israeli government sends jet fighters to evacuate the ambassador and
his staff members. Protesters stormed the Israeli Embassy and significantly
damaged the building. Turkey has expelled the Israeli ambassador and used the
flotilla incident as evidence of its damaged relationship with Israel.
Netanyahu presides over and intransient right-wing coalition that has paralyzed
him. He cannot maintain his government unless he placates this coalition and
that prevents him from conciliation, negotiation, and movement toward the two-state
solution. The Palestinians are going to the United Nations to have the UN declare
the Palestinian state. It seems as if no amount of pressure from the United
States will stop them. Israel is increasingly isolated and the declaration of a
Palestinian state by the General Assembly is likely to cause violence,
confusion, and release a hornet’s nest of attacks on Israel as the Palestinians
gain access to United Nations resources such as the International Criminal Court.
The declaration of a Palestinian state –
even an observer state – will be nothing less than deadly for the peace
process. Israel will not recognize the conditions of the state and a half
million Israelis who live outside the recognized boundaries of Israel proper, but
inside the geography of the new Palestinian state, will be classified as
occupiers. As the relationship between the PLA and Israel deteriorates, and
their mutual security agreements fail, the PLA will slip into the hands of Hamas.
This cascade of events will result in an even worse situation in the Middle
East than is presently the case. What explains it? It is explained by the
coming Arab Muslim Empire.
The tumult in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria,
all of which is supposed to be associated with an Arab Spring, has offered a
reality in striking contrast to expectations and images of a fledgling
democracy. Whether it be Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Libya, or Tunisia it is
possible in every case to result in the rise of Islam. And even if dictators
and brutal leaders in Egypt, Libya, and Syria needed to be ousted the
alternative might not be very satisfying. And the not so invisible hand of Iran
is in the shadows of the background.
We have seen this all before: military
leaders enriching themselves; a few elites pulling the strings of power; inept
and incompetent state institutions; whining blame reserved for other cultures,
mostly Western; and the humiliation associated with the Palestinian situation.
In the earlier part of this century revolutions led to dictatorial leaders,
emancipatory political ideologies such as Marxism, and military rule. But this time
it is going to be Islam that is the big winner. Mark my words, Egypt is not
going to be ruled in the future by the enlightened young Facebook intellectuals
responsible for the revolution and who looked good on television. These people
do not fit the model of traditional communities; they will be out maneuvered by
stronger and more organized religious forces.
As Robert Malley and Hussein Agha argued
in the New York Review of Books,
“Islamists of various tendencies are coming in from the cold.”
Islamists are the largest group in all of these cultures and the best
organized. They have been silenced and repressed in the past but a little
democratic air will allow them to breathe more freely. There was an outcry when
Hamas won democratic elections in Gaza in 2006, but the same is true of
democratic elections as is freedom of speech – in for a dime, in for a dollar:
If we’re going to accept democratic elections as legitimate expressions of the
polity then we have to accept outcomes we don’t prefer. Islamic groups played an
important behind-the-scenes role in Libya, Egypt, and in Syria. They provide a
moral code that speaks to the population and will certainly be the primary
warrant for arguments about the political future of these cultures.
And Islamic parties will probably play
it smart. They will have learned that presenting themselves as Jihadists would
be a mistake and will likely do the opposite; that is, explain to the world
that they are the best defense against Jihadism. The US has dreamt of
democratic forces taking a stronger foothold but we will be mostly
disappointed. And even though the liberal democratic culture of the United
States is quite divergent from conservative Islamic cultures, we will be in a
better position than Israel to curry favor with these new developments. Still,
our political and democratic sympathies lay with Israel whose future in the
Arab world will be beset on all sides by the forces of difficulty.
Why You Will Die for Your Ethnic Group But Not Your Book Club
Political systems
that tolerate and manage diversity are among the most sophisticated and
evolved. Even if there is a tendency toward maximizing self-interest, and
favoring one’s group, modern theory assumes that such narrow interests can be
“learned away.” In other words, the skills and habits of
multiculturalism and diversity will supersede the harsher consequences of
narrow tribal identity. Such assumptions are the foundation of conflict
resolution.
On August 14,
2011 the New York Times reported a
story about how the Dutch are confronting the question of their own identity in
the face of rising fear of Muslims and the right wing anti-immigration
political party of Geert Wilders. The Dutch have a long history of tolerance
and political liberalism so the racism and hate speech circulating in their
culture is alien to them. But the Dutch cohesion and social solidarity has been
based on a history of cultural and ethnic homogenization. It is easy to enforce
rules of behavior on large groups of people when everyone is alike. In
relatively small groups composed of people with similar values and attitudes it
is easy to produce social cohesion and consistency.
But now the Dutch
are faced with social and religious groups in their society that are different
from the dominant group. Now it is time for the test of Dutch political
liberalism. Tolerating diversity has been so easy for the Dutch for so long
that they have forgotten the power of group identity. They have forgotten that
humans developed an evolutionary advantage by recognizing and favoring their
own group. The evolution of Dutch social graces and tolerance means that most
members of Dutch culture do not talk about ethnicity and race. But no one
objects to the hateful things that Wilders says, and a number of those
interviewed in the New York Times
article stated that Wilders was only saying what most people think. The Dutch
are struggling with group identity and will have to relearn its power. It is
group identity that justifies extreme and violent behavior.
Ever wonder
why there is such a long line of people waiting to blow themselves up? How
could it be that anyone except the most crazed outlier can strap Centex to his
waist and blow himself up? There are so many terrorists in the form of suicide
bombers that we have to conclude that any “normal” person is capable
of becoming a terrorist. Individuals in groups that have been frustrated or
insulted in some way are capable of expressing the most extreme anger. A frustrated
and threatened group identity (such as the Dutch identity threatened by Islam)
is far more dangerous than a threatened individual identity. It is the
identification with a group or cause that is the most potent explanatory factor
here.
The incendiary
power of group identity is clear. A terrorist will do unspeakable things in the
name of their group or cause that they would not consider doing for personal
reasons. I should add that the benevolent and compassionate person who is
motivated to self-sacrifice (the medal of honor winner who dives on a hand
grenade) is no different than the terrorist when it comes to powerful group
identification. Rick McCauley in The
Psychology of Terrorism explains these processes and clarifies how
terrorists are typically not poor, miserable, and uneducated. They know what
they are doing and do it willingly.
Group identity
(either ethnic, religious, or political) has the evolutionary advantage of
providing safety as well as obvious reproductive opportunities. But ethnic
identity is particularly potent. It represents a long history of the
convergence of interests. Numerous classical studies of group formation have
demonstrated how easy it is to form a group identity. That’s why people
identify so strongly and so easily with sports teams, organizations, clubs, or
any number of social and economic groups. But ethnic groups are a principal
source of values and individual identity. The fact that states and political
systems have so much trouble incorporating ethnic groups into the state is one
example of the strength of this identification. People will tolerate unjust
economic conditions, but will react violently if their ethnic group is
humiliated or dishonored in some way.
I will close
by pointing out that ethnicity is discussed in academic circles these days as subject
to the vagaries of interaction and a social construction. It is true enough
that people are not “born” with group identities. One does not emerge
from the womb as an “Irish nationalist,” or a “Norwegian,”
or a “Red Sox fan.” But one does emerge from the womb determined to
develop group identities. And the most basic group identities are based on what
we see immediately in front of us – gender and physiology. That’s why gender
and ethnic group identities are so powerful. And that’s why people will die for
their ethnic group, but not their book club.
Can Israel be a Jewish State and Not Discriminate Against the Arab Minority
The word on
the street in Israel is that Palestinians don’t have much problem with Israel
being a “Jewish state” but they do have problems with the Zionist
enterprise. Of course, they won’t recognize Israel as a Jewish state just yet
and refuse to recognize its existence as such. This is some sort of symbolic
denial of Israel and silly in many ways because the partition in 1947 was
designed to create a Jewish state. The whole idea of Israel doesn’t make much
sense if it’s not Jewish. And some day in the distant future when and if there
is truly an end of conflict Israel will be known as a “Jewish state.”
The conflict
is heavily driven by the Arab refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
And even though many Palestinians have more problems with Zionism than Judaism,
they use the denial of Israel as a Jewish state strategically to argue for the
rights of Arab citizens. By denying the Jewish nature of the state they leave
the door open for a Palestinian population that will continue to burrow into
the state of Israel. Palestinians have a strong argument in human rights. About
20% of the population of Israel is Arab and they cannot be denied basic human
rights.
An interesting
debate emerges, however, by posing the question as to whether or not Israel
being a “Jewish state” automatically means discrimination against
others. Can Israel be a Jewish state and not discriminate against the Arab
minority? Well, probably not in the purest sense. Activist Palestinians use
this point quite regularly; that is, they make the argument that if Israel is
Jewish it will mean discrimination against its minority citizens. There are two
problems and inconsistencies here.
First, what
does “discrimination” mean? That will depend on how Jewish the state
is. If it is an Orthodox Torah state then discrimination will be considerable
against everybody. But let’s assume Israel becomes a “reasonable”
Jewish state that recognizes Jewish history and culture but still makes the distinction
between the public and private sphere. In other words, anyone will be able to
practice their own religion and culture within the private confines of their
own home. The state will make certain accommodations for Judaism such as rules
of kashrut, the Sabbath, the calendar, cultural touch points such as street
names, religious holidays, education, and the like. The United States certainly
is not a Christian state but Christian influences are pervasive. School
calendars, government offices, and institutional life all respond to Christian
traditions. As a Jewish state, public schools in Israel will teach some Jewish
history and Zionism. But the matter of private schools and whether or not it
will be possible to avoid the state religion will be debatable. There is a
distinction between discrimination and differences. Just because two groups are
different does not mean one is discriminated against.
It is also
curious that this problem emerges with respect to the Jewish state of Israel
with little or no mention of other religious states. This is an easy point to
make: a number of countries contain the name of the religion in the name of the
country such as the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. Turkey is increasingly an Islamic country even with its secular
military tradition. Jordan’s constitution says that no one can be king who is
not Muslim and this includes converts. All of these countries have minorities,
and to be sure they’re not treated very well, but these countries also come
from different political and cultural histories. They do not have Israel’s
history of democracy and equal rights, a history that should serve them well as
Israel works out these issues.
Other
countries with more democratic traditions such as Denmark, Norway, in England
also have institutionalized religious identities. The Queen of England is the
guardian of Anglican Christianity. The Danes and Norwegians are all part of an
official Church of Denmark and Norway and these are countries that do not
receive the brunt of the world’s criticism.
The problem of Israel being a “Jewish”
state is really very minor. It is true that the legal aspects of certain
minority rights have yet to be argued through, but these problems should not be
insurmountable. And although conservatives in Israel are increasingly trying to
limit civil rights in an effort to ensure the Jewish nature of the state
through legislation, Israel still has no religious test to hold major office
and the Israeli Supreme Court has a strong tradition of guaranteeing human
rights. I understand that some have fundamental objections to any state with an
official religion, but this is a challenge for another time.
Peace and Conflict Politics 