By now it’s
pretty clear that many people jumped to the conclusion that the Arab Spring
would usher in fresh democratic air. This conclusion, which is a combination of
naïveté and hope, mostly emerges from democratic peace theory. This is the
theory that democracies do not fight each other, that they have so much in
common and so many legitimate outlets for conflict resolution that war is never
necessary. This theory is pretty solid and although it can be overstated it is
probably true that an increase in mature fully expressed democracies would make
for a safer world. But there are two dangers to the process of democratization
worth noting, and both may yet find their way into the current instabilities in
various Arab states such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. These two dangers are illiberal democracies and the dangerous
conditions established by that period of time when a state is transitioning to democracy.

Briefly,
illiberal democracies look a little like democracies but rule like autocracies.
They maintain the image of democracy with elections and a certain amount of
personal freedoms but maintain a central autocratic control. Fareed Zakaria in
his well-known Foreign Affairs essay on illiberal democracies explained them most clearly as unbridled majoritarianism riding roughshod over constitutionalism. And Ivan Krastev in the Journal of Democracy refers to “democracies doubles” or regimes that manipulate their own image of democracy but are actually managed democracies.

The most
common two examples of illiberal democracy are Hugo Chavez’s revolutionary
Venezuela and Vladimir Putin’s Russia. There are differences between the two
because Chavez presents himself as a populist and Putin as a manager. Chavez
spreads wealth selectively and maintains his popular image by being highly
critical of the United States. Putin manages a cadre of elites who use certain
institutions such as elections and media to keep themselves in power. Zakaria
explained that these new illiberal democracies are a marriage of global pressures
toward democratization and illiberal traditions.

But the more
dangerous set of conditions, and the ones most pertinent to the Arab Spring, is
when states are in the process of democratizing. This is when they are most
vulnerable and subject to nationalism and special interests. Egypt, Tunisia,
and Iraq are in various states of change with some more vulnerable than others.
There are three dangerous conditions for states making the transition to
democracy. We can see many of these conditions manifesting themselves in Egypt.

First, there
is general confusion and instability. Political leaders make quick and
sometimes dangerous alliances in order to maintain their own power.
Entrepreneurs and elites take advantage of the confusion, or worse yet appeal
to nationalism in order to maintain allegiances. Established organizations such
as the Muslim brotherhood and the military, who have a history of organization,
are in the best positions to manipulate power.

Secondly, all
of the positive aspects of democratization notwithstanding, it does bring with
it often incompatible interests and new groups who feel empowered to protect
their rights and express their agenda. And although this diversity is theoretically
a desirable aspect of democracy, it does make for confusion and the addition of
sometimes unpleasant voices that have a right to be heard. Political
coalitions, business interests, labor unions, and religious groups all compete
for the ear of the populace. Developed and mature democracies can incorporate
and integrate this variety of voices but each is vulnerable during the early
stages of democratization.

Third, the
groups that are threatened by change become most rigid. Established businesses
and entrenched elites have much to lose in the new democratic order and thus
are typically inflexible. In Egypt it appears that even the new democracy
groups who played an active role in the revolution are hesitant to compromise.
In Syria, which I would not classify as in the process of democratization
except for the rumblings of protest, the government has become more rigid and
entrenched in its own violence.

The demand for
democratic reforms is inevitable but dangerous. Of course in the long term
anything that promotes human rights, associational freedoms, and increased popular
power is desirable. The rigidity referred to in three above can be the most
treacherous if it prevents compromises. It appears that compromise and ensuring
the military and elites that they will not be punished or persecuted during
periods of change is necessary for successful transitions. Fear of religious
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood has been so central to Egyptians that the
Brotherhood was outlawed. Now, with group rights and the brotherhood no longer
outlawed they must be held in check by other means. These means are the
compromises and trade-offs that account for successful democracies.

 I’m a pretty strong democracy advocate. I have little doubt in my soul and in whatever intellectual weight I can bring to the problem, that democratic processes are superior to others. I accept that Francis Fukayama was correct, in his book The End of History, that the natural evolution of all political states is toward democracy and market economies. Democracy contains its own moral legitimacy by requiring that the governed sanction governance. This does not ensure quality or competent government, for the governed can surely be inept, but it does guarantee civil legitimacy. 

Still, one cannot be naïve about these things because democracy requires advanced citizenship and a democratic” state of mind” as well as democratic processes. By” state of mind” I mean the attitudes and values of democracy must be internalized by the populace. The populace must understand and accept the inherent values of equality and due process that underscore democratic theory. We can easily cite the cases (Hamas) where democracy was reduced to elections and those elections produced undemocratic governments. The United States is often described as” exceptional” partly because its democracy evolved slowly and accumulated laws and traditions that were honed in a justice system shaped itself from democratic principles.

This is what worries me about the incipient Egyptian democracy. The Muslim brotherhood as a political party will have, and deserves in accordance with democratic principles, a legitimate voice. But the brotherhood contains its own rejections of democracy. I’m reminded of the argument made by Amy Chua in World on Fire that showed how free markets and democratic processes unleashed ethnic demagoguery and more destruction than construction. She, of course, was talking about the particular case of market-dominant minorities; that is ethnic minorities who for a variety of reasons had concentrated wealth. This wealth by minorities caused tremendous ethnonationalism and frustrated indigenous majorities. Her analysis, which is not my chief concern here, demonstrates how democracy and market economies can backfire and cause anger, humiliation, and violence. 

I fear something similar in Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood has been outlawed and controlled in Egypt by an authoritarian system. But they played an important role in the revolution and will expect to be rewarded. It’s possible that Egypt will open up the door to theocracy and a return to a form of Middle Eastern dark ages. 

 The Brotherhood is the forerunner of Hamas and Hezbollah and responsible for the assassination of Sadat in 1981. It is possible to imagine them as a monstrous organization steeped in a distorted tribal mentality that has fire in its breath and blood on its hands. Many people, including myself, yearn for an orderly transition with democratic outcomes. We had dreams in the early days of the protest that some Mandela would step forward, take the nation by the hand and lead it into the future. But it’s more likely that we have handed over Egypt to the Muslim Brotherhood. The brotherhood has remained coy. They have kept quiet and shunned the violence. They are not stupid, they know that such rhetoric would be very counterproductive at this point in time. 

Does anyone really think that a government that includes the Brotherhood will maintain its peace agreement with Israel? ElBaradei has already made statements that placed the peace agreement in jeopardy. In some ways Egypt is moving from a political system in which it would be easier to transition to democracy than one which contains serious Islamic ideology. Ideological systems like socialism or Islam are very ingrained and do not change easily. Regimes governed by raw authoritarianism oppress their people and plant the seeds of revolution. These uprisings often lead to democratic changes or calls for more freedom and political rights. This is not so in ideological regimes. 

Hard as it is to imagine, the Shah of Iran was a paragon of enlightenment compared to the mullahs governing Iran. The Muslim brotherhood is the most organized political force in Egypt: it represents the genuine religious interests of much of the population and, like it or not, simply cannot be ignored. It is the organizational and ideological wellspring of the global Islamist movement. And although Egypt is different from Iran, and will not become a thoroughly theocratic state, the Muslim brotherhood will be empowered. There are reasons to be afraid, very afraid.

There is much talk these days about democratization in Egypt. But even the most optimistic among us realize that this will be a long and slow process. Nevertheless, the seeds for future democracy are currently being planted by an intellectual engagement from the youth of Egypt. But despite the attractiveness of the idea of democracy around the world, it remains a contested term. This is particularly true in the Islamic world. In other words, what would an Islamic democracy look like? What components of the state do you want run by Islam and which by pragmatic democratic means?

For successful democratization of Egypt Islamic groups must be part of the political process. Even more specifically democratization should align itself with Islam as much as possible otherwise it will not succeed. This begs the question about which aspects of Islam are most amenable to democratization and which are not.

Democracies struggle if they are not run well. Egypt has a staggering amount of work ahead and for now we can only point to numerous challenges including creating a constitution, developing strong institutions, solving problems of leadership, and creating communicative and associational freedoms. And all of these must be consistent with basic principles of Islam. This will be a challenge because, in general, there is not a strict separation of the temporal from the spiritual in Islamic culture. The importance of separation of church and state as we know it in the West is not so apparent to Muslim culture. And if we lecture Muslim leaders on the importance of secular governance they will point properly to the failures of ideologies like nationalism, socialism, and secularism to deliver good governance.

But mainstream Islam can be politicized because Islam is a religion that values the mundane; in other words, the everyday activities of life, such as running the Department of Waste Management, are regarded as a form of piety. This is an important issue in political Islam because it can help teach accountability on earth. The entanglement of religion and politics can be a positive thing if the spirituality of religion is used to advance justice and equality. Islam does not stipulate a required political structure, but it does foster a fair and equitable political order.

In the West we argue that the privatization of religion is necessary to keep democratic governance fair. But this won’t hold for Muslim cultures. They want something we might call “religious democracy.” It’s possible that the idea of a religious democracy is completely untenable, a contradiction in terms. And there are numerous examples where this would be true of Islamic interpretations. We would not expect, for example, democracy to take root in a country like Iran because Iran has no liberal understanding of the separation of church and state. But other models are possible. Islam in the political realm can embolden people sufficiently that the public demands competence and accountability, and can be removed when necessary.

I’m arguing for the possibility of a native democratic paradigm that is realistic. Turkey is typically cited as a country that is both Muslim and democratic. And although it is a good model of religion and democracy it remains flawed and still too dependent on the military for stability. In Egypt, the state will remain neutral in matters of faith and religious structures must place the common good ahead of scriptural interpretation.

Islam and democracy will coexist in Egypt if Islam respects its classical heritage of peace and harmony instead of human claims to represent the word of God. Islam’s concern with justice can serve as a foundation for a well running civil society. Still, a watchful eye must be kept on the lookout for any attempt to deprive people of the civil good on the basis of religiosity. A native Islam and democracy project must include the concept of “the citizen.”

The key to a native Islam and democracy is to recognize the relationship between the religion and the well-being of all citizens and the nation-state. The ethical politics of Islam can serve as a guide for the good of all humans. Only then can Islam both serve the spiritual needs of the community and properly manage the state bureaucracies.

The world is waiting and watching events in Egypt. Democracy advocates are claiming that we are witnessing the transition to democracy. In the last 25 years there has been a change in the political environment represented by increased democratization. Crumbling authoritarian regimes in Europe,  defeated military dictatorships in Latin America, as well as liberalizing tendencies in the Middle East have all been associated with what Samuel
Huntington called the third-wave of democracy.

Carothers, writing in the Journal of Democracy in 2002, explained that the conditions of the third wave were transformed into a more general paradigm for understanding democratization. This was called the transition paradigm. The transition paradigm is characterized by five key assumptions: (1) the country is moving away from dictatorial rule, (2) that the change comes in stages, (3) that genuine elections are what most confer legitimacy, (4) economics and political history are not major influences on the process of democratization, and (5) the democracy project is being built on a coherent and functioning state.

Yet, I do not believe that this transition paradigm is very descriptive of what is going on in Egypt. True enough, it looks as if Egypt is shedding authoritarian rule and one might even note that the change is coming in stages (an arguable point). But as a whole the changes in Egypt fail to match many of the assumptions of the transition paradigm. Or, at least we should wait and see. It is too early to tell if Egypt is truly transitioning to democracy. Let me elaborate.

First, there have been more than a few incidents of countries moving away from authoritarian rule when in fact they never made a transition to democracy. We have been too quick to make this assumption. There was a time when the United States described the Congo and Somalia as on a path to democratization. Egypt could yet replace one system of authority with another, or end up with increased illiberal Islamic rule.

Second, we have no reliable sense in which Egypt is experiencing stages of democratization. Other countries such as South Korea and Mexico did not go through a particular process. Egypt’s political turmoil has erupted unexpectedly, except for the argument that change in Tunisia had a contagious effect, and did not seem to follow a sequence such as settling Constitutional issues or consolidating civil society. The idea that democratization unfolds as a rational process is tenuous. Most change is chaotic, jerky, and moves forward and backward in an irregular manner.

The folly of equating elections with democratization, or as the ultimate expression of democratization, is most troublesome. It is true that Egypt’s elections have been sufficiently controlled and do not measure up as democratic elections, but this is a minor point in the whole process. Sometimes political cultures experience genuine elections but political participation in general and governmental accountability is poor. And it is
certainly possible that elections can result in illiberal authoritarian rule rooted in religion or ideology.

Fourth, there is a tendency to overweight single democratic acts such as vigorous protests and overlook structural conditions that help fashion political outcomes. Successful cases of democratization often display economic well-being, a history of political activity, and a civil society that has outlets for conflict resolution. Egypt has a large Islamic brotherhood party in the region and only a limited experience with democratic political activity. Although the elites are educated and economically comfortable there is a significant portion of the society that is struggling and has little confidence in political institutions.

Finally, many of the successful transitions to democracy during the third-wave were in political polities that were unstable. This poses challenges but also has advantages because when state – building from scratch it is possible to avoid intractable structures of power and wealth that are difficult to eliminate. But this is not the case for Egypt which is
an intact state that has entrenched power structures. Egypt will have to encourage decentralization and strengthen legislative and judicial branches of government after the protesters go home. This will be difficult and a clear barrier to the potential for democratization.

I do not know what will happen in the weeks and months to come but I do know that assessing the political context in Egypt is difficult business. The transition model to democracy is a sophisticated framework even though it applies sporadically to various countries. I share a hope with fellow democracy advocates that Egypt will evolve toward a market economy and liberal democracy. What I am not sure about is the path that it will take.