Julian Assange and Information Rights: Part 2
As I stated in the previous post, Julian Assange is clinging to free speech rights and access to information rights to defend his release of government documents. He’s being held criminally for releasing such information and violating presumed security rights of the state.
All speech is free speech except for that which is justifiably constrained. The nature of this constraint and meaning of “justifiably constrained” is what we will explore here for the moment. We begin with the entering assumption that freedom of expression is a basic human right and if we are going to error than we will error on the side of free expression. So, we take the most well-known example of yelling “fire” in a crowded theater when there is no fire, people rush to the exits and hundreds are trampled to death, and then “free speech” is your defense of what you did. You do not of course have the right to freedom of expression when it endangers so many people. You obviously cannot be responsible for the deaths of hundreds of moviegoers and stroll away comfortably on the basis of freedom of speech.
Moreover, the most specific constraint on freedom of expression is “imminence.” This means that you cannot cause imminent or immediate danger as a result of your expressive behavior. So the Nazis and skinheads have a right to express their political opinions (noxious as they might be) but they do not have the right to express those opinions while marching through a Jewish neighborhood creating imminent danger and clearly provoking violence. One of the legal arguments against Assange is that he retrieved government documents that had been classified and were not available to the public. But it is easy to “classify” something. And even though we cannot have individuals making their own decisions about what justifies being classified and what does not, the principle of available access to information and free expression does require justification if your rights are going to be constrained. Last February on this blog I wrote about bloggers and new media with respect to their contribution to the Arab Spring. I retrieved from Wikileaks a copy of a briefing (reference ID 09CAIRO544) about bloggers broadening their discourse. The briefing from 2009 warned that Egypt’s bloggers were playing an increasingly important role in broadening the scope of the acceptable political communication. Bloggers’ discussion of sensitive issues such as the military and politics represented a significant change from the previous five years and had influenced society.
As recently as 2009 the cable noted that a more open atmosphere had been created. Bloggers were influencing independent media to break important news and cover previously ignored or forbidden topics. One personal rights activist in Egypt stated that the youth were able to express their views about social and political issues in ways they never could before. Free speech tends to produce free speech, and the accumulation of effects from blogs in Egypt is apparent.
This post about blogs was an effort to explain how more information was circulating in Egypt and that was at least partially responsible for political uprising demanding even more freedoms. Was the release of a cable that reported on the general state of bloggers in Egypt a security matter? Surely such a cable does not rise to the level of significance of military secrets or something that can directly affect the safety of the state. In fact, if a government is tracking bloggers and writing reports about blogging in an effort to thwart access to certain information then this should be known to the public. It does not threaten the security of the state.
It does hold, and is imperative, that if citizens of a state are going to monitor the conduct of their government and engage fully democratically then they have to have access to state information – at least certain types of state information. Moreover, government should not be allowed to impose limitations on the citizenry under the pretext of national security and their rights to “classify” information.
The burden, if you will, must be not on access to information but on the government’s decisions to constrain that access by classifying information; that is, freedom of information and symbolic expression is the default political condition and the burden of proof that communicative rights must be limited is on the state. Below are a few more specific principles:
- As much as possible any restrictions on freedom of information must be prescribed by law beforehand. Restriction conditions should be drawn as precisely as possible.
- There must be opportunities for independent courts to judge the quality of safeguards for freedom of information.
- To restrict freedom of expression or information there must be a compelling explanation for the protection of national security. Some examples are in cases of war or military threat, internal sources of discord, or incitement to overthrow the government. This explanation must not only be compelling but able to show specific harm.
I’m not defending Julian Assange per se. His methods are of course illegal and of all the thousands of documents he gained access to and released there are probably more than a few that could have been classified as genuine security threats. But it becomes a little easy to accept government restrictions on freedom of information rather than honor the rights of a democratic society. A good way to keep the proper balance between democratic rights and security is to remember the principles below:
- People have the right to information about public officials in the workings of the state. Limitations on those rights must be clearly and strongly justified. A security justification designed to deny information must be unequivocal with respect to protecting national security interests.
- The public’s right to know is the most foundational assumption.
- There should be a clear system in place which provides independent review and credible oversight of situations where information rights are limited.
- If a person discloses information that is not harmful and is found not to pass the test of legitimate constraints, then that person should not be criminally charged.
- It should be possible for the public’s right to know to outweigh the importance of disclosed information.
- Confidential sources should be protected.
- New technology should make information as available as possible and open to scrutiny by the public.
Assange is not the newest hero for freedom of information. He not only has a grandiose ego and sees himself as the great liberator of information, but Assange goes at the problem with a machete rather than a scalpel. He captured access to thousands of documents with no concern for the nuances of their importance. Still, he has infused new energy into a tired but important democratic principle.
WikiLeaks and Freedom of Expression Versus Security: Part 1
Julian Assange is currently seeking refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. Assange is an interesting character with some quirky and brilliant personality traits, but these are not my main concern. Assange is considered a criminal in the United States because he gained access to secret documents by way of an American soldier named Bradley Manning. Manning is imprisoned in the US for leaking documents to Assange.
Assange manages the website Wikileaks which organizes and makes available thousands of government and diplomatic documents once classified as “secret.” Assange makes the argument that his work is centered in the long tradition of open expression and the importance of citizens keeping an eye on their government. Wikileaks publishes information from whistleblowers and seeks to make political governance a far more open process. Assange is no fringe character. He considers himself a revolutionary democratic leader devoted to freedom and has been the recipient of awards from Amnesty International, Time Magazine, and other journalistic outlets. The governments from which he took documents do not quite see it that way. They see Assange as challenging the security rights of the United States and violating laws designed to protect the nation. The US wants to charge Assange with jeopardizing national security, a charge that could result in life imprisonment. Hence we have the tension between freedom of information and security.
In what has been described as an Evita moment, Assange gave a speech from the Ecuadorian Embassy balcony which you can see here: Wikileaks
There was a large crowd and he spoke of freedom of the press. There have been other cases where journalists have reported from what is considered to be improper access to government documents. The Pentagon papers in the United States, albeit under quite different political and military conditions, were also considered a potential threat to national security. Israel has more than a few examples of journalists writing stories based on classified documents.
Opinions differ on this matter. Some see Assange, Bradley Manning, and journalists who report from secret government documents as traitors who reveal government secrets and expose the nation to damages that result from security breaches. On the other hand, they can be seen as advocates for free speech and transparent information for exposing the public to a full critical analysis of issues facing them. Some people take a third position by parsing the issues into justified and unjustified release of information. Thus, they criticize hacking into American government sites but support the release of documents from authoritarian governments such as those in Syria, Zimbabwe, or Saudi Arabia.
Because Assange is an interesting and charismatic figure, and because he has been accused of sex crimes (always a matter of interest), he has been able to use his celebrity status to rally thousands of people around the world and perhaps delay his arrest and generate interest in his cause. But it remains the case that all governments support their own security interests. And they will all in the end oppose improper access and leaking of classified material. Moreover, they will continue to sing songs of media freedom but maintain a common refrain about their own security rights. The tension between freedom of the press and security will continue because many documents marked “secret” are not really very important. It is easy to classify a document as secret but much less easy to justify the content of the document as truly requiring a “secret” classification.
There is no easy answer to these issues but the following are necessary in a democratic society, which is where we must begin. Openness to information is a far less threat to the general body politic than excessive secrecy or security. From the Johannesburg Principles on National Security and Freedom of Expression (http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf) we can quickly pose the following requirements for a democratic society that wants to limit freedom of expression:
To establish a restriction on freedom of expression or information it is necessary to protect a legitimate national security interest, a government must demonstrate that: (a) the expression or information at issue poses a serious threat to a legitimate national security interest; (b) the restriction imposed is the least restrictive means possible for protecting that interest; and (c) the restriction is compatible with democratic principles.
In the next post I will turn our attention more specifically to the legal and philosophical issues that we must grapple with in order to balance the freedom of expression versus security scale.
Peace Journalism
One of the best ways to transform ethnic conflict is by means of consensus democracy or the sharing of power between groups. Consociation is an ideal to be sure, but it remains an important aspiration. At a minimum, it rules out the use of force for achieving unilateral objectives. An additional deliberative goal is a media that is oriented toward peace and solving problems rather than intensifying them. This would be part of a consensus democracy project and would represent a shift in priorities from sensationalism trying to attract readers to conflict resolution. This has been termed peace journalism by McGoldrick & Lynch, a term often met with skepticism as too simplistic.
Journalist organizations remain convinced that the media are not only positioned to illuminate conflicts but to actually resolve them and encourage cooperation. By practicing the best journalism the media can contribute to bridge building between conflicting groups. This calls for an activist journalism that relies on a set of practices that go beyond straightforward reporting about conflicts. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) calls on reporters to be trained in conflict resolution and to have the promotion of peace as their goal. They are asked to be well versed in the narratives of both sides of an issue and scrupulously avoid reinforcing violence. Moreover, journalists should be equally as concerned with solutions and common ground as much as the basics of a story. McGoldrick and Lynch pose a set of guidelines for the coverage of conflicts that are too numerous to list here, but include techniques such as (1) avoid simplifying the contest by enumerating the various goals of the conflicting parties, (2) avoid stark distinctions, (3) see ourselves in others, (4) avoid reporting on only violence, (5) report on peace initiatives, (5) identify wrongdoers, (6) avoid demonizing words, (7) do not see signing documents and military victories as creating peace, and others.
These recommendations can lead one to believing that clear reporting and sensitive concerns will enlighten readers and advance peace. But journalists live and work in political, economic, and power systems like everyone else. They are not independent actors who can determine effects. Hence, a biased and aggressive media will have less impact on an educated audience than and uneducated one; a prosperous and comfortable society will be less responsive to a challenging media. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the media can contribute to a helpful deliberative environment. Transparency, rationality, diversity, and the promotion of quality journalism are all part of peace journalism as well as deliberation. Bell (1997) refers to a sort of peace journalism as the journalism of attachment, that is, the concern is more for people than issues. Attachment journalism is not necessarily deliberative but it does represent a broadened sensibility to balance. It helps quiet the persistent refrain about how violence and drama captures attention, and peace is boring. Most journalism related to conflicts is “war” journalism and preoccupied with propaganda and violence. But “peace” journalists can be easily manipulated and subjected to propaganda that they are not able to understand. Gowing (1997) explains how journalists are easily manipulated and not always able to check facts. They sometimes begin to identify with one party and simplify or distort information. In the end, journalism must take a critical stance such that it does not encourage violence but also avoids disseminating peace propaganda. The critical stance requires transparency and, most important, a diversity of opinion that comes with exposure to quality disagreement and the avoidance of polarization.
The Communicative Construction of Identity
The below is an excerpt from my book “Deliberative Communication and Ethnopolitical Conflict.”
The preference for one’s own kin is powerful. But identities are not fixed at birth. They are subject to developmental and social influences. They are not flimsy and change at will, but they are constructed out of the surrounding interactional environment. As Suny (2001) argues, identities are fashioned by the stories groups tell about their history, nature, homeland, and common descent. People change identities over time because such identities depend on networks of associations and proximity to others. An Israeli-Jew who lives in Israel will identify as “Israeli” but his son or daughter who moves to the U.S. will identify more as an American. The over arching “American” identity is very important here because it serves as a common identity category that helps perpetuate a commitment to a more general civic allegiance. Deep ethno-national divisions are most associated with violence and those situations where ethnic groups believe the state should cease to exist. The role of the deliberative experience in giving group members new communicative opportunities is most important for developing an over arching identity that can render each side more receptive to argumentative claims.
The actual nature and content of ethnic identity is a symbolic construction process done for instrumental reasons from instrumental resources. The conceptual difficulty with ethnic identity is that rigorous objective definitions of ethnic groups do not allow for variability and change or the importance of developmental processes and identity. Subjective definitions make it difficult to understand the nature and evolution of individual ethnic identity. Moreover, even if ethnic identity is not objective, and it is subject to social influences and manipulation, it remains an essential construct that is not only experienced as very real to people, but is strongly implicated in much human behavior. Instrumentalism is the idea that choosing an identity group is a practical decision that has potential beneficial outcomes. There is more human choice in instrumental notions of ethnic identity. Instrumentalism is how identity is formed. It is also the means by which identity is exercised. I will accept Brass’ (1996) description of instrumentalism as beginning with objective markers (race, religion, dress, food, dialect) but these are interpreted and subjected to change.
Instrumentalism recognizes a strong flexibility and developmental influence on identity formation. Yet, after an identity has been set it is very difficult to change. It is how people see themselves that matter. They may identify around a type of clothing at one time but something else later. This ensures that the group identity remains stable and only the token that refers to the group type changes. One is bound to his ethnic identity on the basis of personal relations, practical necessity, and common interests. Elites use these relationships to solidify identity groups for their own political interests. Slobodan Milosevic employed the rhetoric of victimization to characterize Serbs as in need of liberation through destruction. This was a clear instrumental use of political conditions to construct an interpretation of national identity.
Israeli identity is particularly interesting because it can serve as sort of laboratory for how social, political, and cultural resources are marshaled in the service of identity construction. And it is a good example of the instrumental construction of identity. Israel is a new state that differs from others in that it had no preexisting nationhood. The early Israeli immigrants shared no common culture, and new immigrants after the establishment of the state came from diasporic communities in many parts of the world. Still, Israel benefited from the common sense of Jewish nationhood. Even though this was not a geographically bounded national territory, and Jews lived as minorities with different languages, cultures, and appearance, they believed in a common ethnic descent. This included a common religious heritage, language, and affection for a territorial area (ancient land of Israel). As Smooha explains, these were the common bonds and ideological foundations of the state of Israel but the task of the Zionists was to organize these instrumental resources into an identity. Thus, Jews that began to settle in Israel were not called immigrants but “returnees” connoting their temporary absence from the homeland and their return to it with full rights. Various symbols of the state (e.g. Star of David, blue stripes, menorah) are taken from religious and biblical history, which is shared by Jews and easily identifiable by everyone.
Jewish ethnic identity in Israel has been strongly encouraged by assimilationist policies (Smooha, 2004). In order to seek a stronger base of unity the identification of ethnic differences was discouraged. Even though there were obvious differences (physiological and cultural) between Jews from Arab countries and Eastern Europe, these differences were less important than common Jewish ethnic heritage. All Jews are granted automatic and full citizenship. Jews from Arab countries do not go to culturally separate schools or are encouraged to foster a distinct Jewish identity (Smooha, 2004). There is certainly individual prejudice and economic and inequities, but these are outside official state efforts to fashion a cohesive Jewish ethnic identity. And, of course, nothing solidifies an ethnic identity like existential threat. The relentless Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the conflict ethos that permeates the culture, cultivates unity among Jews. Ethnic identity in Israel is produced and reproduced by politics, social class, and the ethnic separation that has characterized the Mizrahim and the Ashkenazi since the early days of the state. For the case of Israel, Smooha (2004) describes the persistence of ethnic identity and the major fault lines that divide ethnic groups (class, economics, cultural hegemony, conflict).
Identities develop communicatively in the context of relationships but the Israelis and Palestinians are in the unique position of developing group identities under conditions of conflict. When this happens, the open flow of information stops and individuals feel threatened. They feel destabilized and a strong sense of self preservation ensues. The impulse to respond in a violent manner is activated as an act of self preservation. This causes members of respective groups to “protect” themselves and “defeat” the other. The entire flow of information in the environment becomes distorted such that the normal refinement of ideas about ourselves that produces growth and development closes down. Group polarization becomes apparent and our negative images of the other become frozen in time. The development of our ethnic or group identity no longer incorporates new images of the enemy group, especially as contact with the other group diminishes or becomes informally restrictive. Under normal conditions processing new information that leads to identity change and development is self-protective and allows us to function and manage the world. But frozen identities under conditions of conflict close down the learning process as a new form of survival.
Identities become rigid as beliefs solidify and each group considers its view of events as most accurate. Attitudes about responsibility and blame take on great certainty. In Maoz and Ellis (2001) we found that Israelis and Palestinians argued from positions of certainty and because each side is relatively closed off from the other, their conclusions about resolving the conflict were formed in informational isolation. This resulted in conclusions that were unrealizable and based on zero-sum thinking because each side dismissed the other’s assessment. Identities fashioned in conflict are particularly characterized by the “blame game.” Since it is unlikely that one looks inward for blame, failures and responsibility are cast on the evil other. This protects a positive self image and maintains the group’s integrity.
Ethnicity is highly implicated in many political conflicts and involved in an identity development that is conflictual as well as ethnic. In other words, during the developmental process is when an ethnic conflict ethos can also become part of an adolescent’s fundamental ethnic identity. They develop not only recognition of membership in a descent group, but an oppositional relationship with an out-group is part of that definition. Strongly ideologically based Israeli-Jews and West Bank and Gaza Arabs, for example, have grown up in a societal milieu where the attachment process to their ethnic group includes an ethos of conflict. This culture of conflict supplies a steady stream of messages about what it means to be a member of an ethnopolitical group. The significant events in the developmental life of young people include religious, political, and cultural rites of passage that fuel ethnic distinctiveness. These are the conditions of intractability when identities are developed and defined in opposition to others. The identity is not one of simply a single implication of ethnic membership formulated normally with a customary amount of pride. Rather, it is a conflictual identity with double implications—the group membership is functional and allows for management in a difficult society, but then continues the conflict.
In work over the years with Israelis and Palestinians (cf. Ellis, 2006; Maoz & Ellis, 2006) it is possible to see the communicative and relational consequences of these conflict based identities. The protection of ethnopolitical group identity plays an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both sides feel threatened and the Israeli state stimulates a sense of humiliation for the Palestinians. And although the two state solution and the creation of a Palestinian state is now accepted by most Israelis, such a state continues to be threatening. There remains a zero-sum mentality that makes a solution that satisfies both sides still illusive. Both sides cling to ideas about what is “right” and have trouble finessing their positions because of their failure to continually process new information. Both sides have a long history of trauma and humiliation. The creation of the State of Israel was painful for the Palestinians and they feel historically marginalized and discriminated against, which has led to cycles of violence and revenge fantasies. The Jews, on the other hand, carry historical victimization and discrimination culminating in the holocaust. Hence, both sides have mirror victimization identities and are locked in a no win argument about who is more deserving. This sort of identity pain can last for decades or even centuries.
Obama Support for Israel Is Strong
One of the least defensible arguments levied against Barack Obama is that he is weak on Israel and does not properly support the security of Israel. This is simply an indefensible position. Essentially the Republican attack machine has made it its business to distort Obama’s record with respect to Israel in an effort to capture Jewish voters. As usual, the strategy has been to take Obama’s recognition of complexity, diplomacy, and slightly more complete understanding of the issues and turn it into a weakness. I grant you that Obama talks about Israel and the Middle East with greater nuance and understanding of what it will really take to solve problems but this does not detract from his support for Israel. He recognizes that Israel is essentially a mirror of the United States and, of course, the importance of security issues for Israel. Those who question Obama simply have to look at the record. Some months ago Obama said that “the United States will always have Israel’s back” and he meant it. I cite just some of the evidence below for how Obama has operationalized his support for Israel.
Apparently, those questioning Obama support for Israel missed the signing ceremony last week of the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act. This was a bill reaffirming the special relationship between United States and Israel and, more importantly, ensuring that Israel has all the necessary weapons and assistance to protect itself. The Enhanced Security Cooperation Act extends loan guarantees to Israel, boosts Israel’s credit rating, and authorizes the sale of $1.6 billion in US weapons available whenever needed. Moreover the law requires that Israel maintain its military superiority in the region and affirms US commitment to defend Israel in the United Nations Security Council.
Obama’s support for a two state solution, consistent with comments made by Netanyahu, is in line with the most prevalent thinking about how to resolve the problem with the Palestinians and maintain the Jewish nature of the State of Israel. The two state solution is increasingly problematic and difficult to impose but it represents strong support for the ethnoreligious core of the Israeli state.
The debilitating sanctions against Iran, who at this time represents the most direct threat to the State of Israel, are mostly the work of President Obama. Iran is now cut off from financial markets, cannot land in many airports around the world, and has oil sales that are a trickle compared to the previous flows. Obama has built an international coalition and stood on the world stage in defense of Israel’s security needs.
Obama’s presidential leadership and staff challenged the international community and prevented the statehood move by the Palestinians in the United Nations. This represented the correct argument that Palestinian statehood should be the result of negotiations between Israel and Palestine, that the establishment of the state through procedures separate from the political realities in which it is embedded would not be recognized by the other nor considered legitimate.
The Obama administration challenged the discredited Goldstone Report which was noteworthy in its biases against Israel and partially responsible for its author distancing himself from his own report. Obama stated clearly that Israel had a right to defend itself when Israel was criticized for its defensive actions off its coast.
It took tremendous courage for Obama to confront the Arab League in Cairo in 2009 and unabashedly declare US support for Israel. Obama told them our support for Israel was steadfast. Expressing some well-placed defensible criticism of Israel (e.g. with respect to the West Bank) should be viewed as part of our support for Israel and its future state; it is certainly no sign of weakness.
A variety of strong Israel supporters, Zionists, and political leaders, from Edgar Bronfman to Ehud Barack call Obama a friend and the leader who has deepened and strengthened the relationship between United States and Israel.
Israel is constantly plagued and harassed by terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and Obama supported Israel’s refusal to negotiate with such groups by announcing that “no country can be expected to negotiate with a terrorist organization sworn to its destruction.” Israel’s Dome Missile-Defense System was developed in cooperation with United States and is effective for intercepting Hamas and Hezbollah rockets. It is a security system received during the presidency of Barack Obama.
Obama is a thoughtful and decisive leader who recognizes the importance and cultural resonance of Israel. The argument that he insufficiently supports Israel simply does not hold water. The State of Israel is stronger and more secure today because of Barack Obama.
Romney’s Foreign-Policy Chops
Here’s what Mitt Romney said the other day while speaking in Jerusalem:
“We have a solemn duty and a moral imperative to deny Iran’s leaders the means to follow through on their malevolent intentions. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that containment is an option.”
According to most analyses Romney took a rather aggressive stand supporting preemptive strikes and doing more than the diplomatic dance of the United States. Romney’s performance in Israel is a pretty good test of his foreign-policy chops and his diplomatic skills. He didn’t fail the test but his grade is fairly low. He embarrassed the English during their Olympic moment on the world stage, his characterization of the Palestinians as being culturally behind, and that’s why their gross national product is not as high as Israel’s, is pretty naïve and may even contain a tinge of racism. But he was not completely wrong about Iran and difficulties we face.
The Republic of Iran wants to be a nuclear power. They want a seat at the table with the grown-ups who have the biggest weapon and the most threat. The question of whether or not they deserve a seat at the table remains to be seen. I think you have to prove yourself. Just like you do not get to handle that big machine we call an automobile until you pass the test, you don’t get the responsibility of having nuclear weapons until you demonstrate you can handle the responsibility. Declaring that Allah is guiding your missiles and that some cultures need annihilation does not exactly represent the sort of maturity the world is looking for. But Iran does not seem to care much because they are defying international pressure and seemed to be unconcerned with any diplomatic efforts.
Iran turning its nose up at UN Security Council resolutions directing them to suspend enrichment, and refusing to explain fully their nuclear intentions do not add up to an acceptable definition of “maturity.” It is simply dangerous for Iran to enter the inner sanctum of the nuclear club: there are plenty of reasons for this danger not the least of which is the addition of more nuclear weapons capable of detonation, but the extent to which it would embolden the Iranians is one of the most dangerous. They already support terror in various places in the world and membership in the nuclear club would probably just encourage them to continue their terrorist ways against the United States and Israel. Even if there were some semblance of checks on their nuclear arsenal this sort of provocative activity could spur a conventional war. There is no doubt that tensions in the Middle East would escalate. Israel has a nervous finger on the trigger of nuclear weapons and the foreign-policy rooted in existential threat. Israel responds sharply to existential threat and the nuclear Iran would certainly qualify.
The geopolitical balance of power would be altered and the pickings would be ripe for additional nuclear proliferation. Allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would undermine efforts to control weapons and how they are used. It would also be a defeat for the United States who has led the efforts to stop Iran and essentially organized the boycott. If the United States is perceived as failing to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons than the question of US power and influence will be unanswered.
There remains diplomacy to play out. Simply attacking Iran would be very provocative and causes many problems as it might solve. Some diplomatic process is the only alternative at this point. But the hell of it is that nothing much can be done during the political campaign because there are significant differences between the Democrats and the Republicans on this matter. The argument that Obama is weak on Iran does not hold much water. Obama is not weak on Iran, he is smart on Iran. It is simply reckless and dangerous to sound like a gunslinger on this issue. Obama is capable of convincing people that he is a tough guy – note the Osama bin Laden takedown – and I think he can be equally tough on Iran.
Even if we give Mitt Romney the benefit of the doubt he has plenty to learn. He was clumsy and somewhat ill-informed on this trip to Europe and the Middle East. His foreign-policy credentials are of course thin and we cannot wait too long for him to fatten them up.
Thank You Bob Costas for Remembering the Tragic Munich Olympics
Bob Costas asked the International Olympic Committee to have a moment of silence in memory of the slain Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics. The IOC rejected the request offering the usual argument about not wanting to politicize the games, a standard they do not always hold themselves to. Costas, who should be commended for his courage and dignity, told the IOC that he was going to remember the moment anyway and is planning something for the opening ceremony.
I think this issue is important and worthy of some commentary. One of the problems with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that nothing seems to transcend the rank politics of the conflict. If I wrote a high-minded defense of Costas and thought that this tragedy deserved cultural and historical recognition most would simply dismiss it and categorize me as “another Israel supporter.” And the converse is true for those who might deny the request for recognition. They would be cavalierly cast as anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian. The consequence of this constant simplistic bifurcation of the conflict is that it becomes impossible to talk about anything else. This is certainly true of any notion of “truth.” One cannot even report in a straightforward descriptive manner what actually occurred during some political event. Everything is steeped in interpretive implications, and combine this with facile notions of the “social construction of reality” and nothing is what it seems. This is essentially the situation with contemporary American politics and the Tea Party. They are so concerned with ideological and political purity that any other form of talk resulting in true deliberation – the kind of deliberation where one side might actually learn something and adjust their opinions – is impossible.
But isn’t it possible to ask what sort of political act is actually deserving of memory and recognition. Isn’t it possible, regardless of what side of the political spectrum you occupy, to condemn group specific murder as unacceptable? Isn’t it possible for the Olympic Games, with its long history of fellowship and cultural cooperation to stand up for something as clearly odious as targeted murder of an ethnopolitical group within the context of the games? The killing of the Israeli athletes was not a disembodied violent act but one that was wrapped in Olympic significance.
The tragedy of the Munich Olympics, along with its enduring images, is truly a cultural collective memory that endures because of the kinship that surrounds participation in the Olympics. It is true enough that we construct our pasts with contemporary culture in mind but that is what simply keeps a historical occurrence alive with fresh meaning and relevant meaning.
There is a relationship between tragedy and historical meaning. A tragedy always connects culture, the social, and the visual physiological environment. And, perhaps more importantly, tragedy binds individuals to groups and community. Consequently, the events of the Munich Olympics have bound individual and groups and infused their membership in these groups with significance, a significance that sweeps through time and becomes part of history.
It’s important to commemorate and remember the horrific violence of the 1972 Munich Olympics because it has become a collective memory signifying the full sweep of political consciousness and conflict. Collective memories define group identities and signal people as to their individual identities. Remembering the Munich tragedy should prompt people to ask themselves who they are and what they will accept.
We should remember that there is competition for what is recalled and remembered in the past. Disagreements about remembering events are always hotly contested and one version of the story “wins out” over another and thus becomes a more dominant theme along with changing the historical story. Historical events that were once considered objectively, or as objectively as possible, become pawns in a game designed to manage the perception of reality. Memories and proper understanding of events are most contested and manipulated during periods of confusion and uncertainty. We are currently struggling with understanding political conflicts, anti-Semitism, nationalist struggles, and how to reconcile history with contemporary circumstances. This is especially true for the prototypical intractable conflict that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It is sometimes said that the past is manipulated in order to fashion the present. If that were true, why wouldn’t we want to recognize the horrific events of the 1972 Olympics in order to inform and sensitize the present?
“The West Bank is not Occupied” says Levy Committee
The established nature and routine life of the settlements was interesting to me during the 2 1/2 months I recently spent in Israel living and conducting some research in the settlements. The notion that some of these large settlements such as Ariel will ever be moved defies imagination. Construction in the town of Ariel continues along with new additions to the University Center and upgrades of city services. Even though settlements have questionable legal status the state continues to provide necessary infrastructure for the maintenance of the settlements. Inside Israel proper are road signs, mileage markers, and general information facilitating travel as well as the provision of necessary services.
A couple of weeks ago Prime Minister Netanyahu organized a panel about the status of the West Bank. The panel was headed by Justice Levy, and the panel’s primary conclusion was that Israel cannot be seen as “occupying” the West Bank. The original report is available here. The Levy committee concluded that the concept of occupation did not apply on the basis of international law. The main argument is that there was no established sovereign state on what is now called the West Bank and therefore Israel cannot be accused of occupying this land. The report goes on to explain how Israel has a right to the land and this includes the right to transfer populations if necessary. The report continues with a long list of laws that should be annulled in order to encourage settlement in the West Bank, followed by a list of suggestions and procedures that will facilitate Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria.
The “left” in Israel maintains that Judea and Samaria are occupied on the basis of international law ever since they were captured in 1967. But the panel accepted the argument from the “right” by explaining that the idea of “occupation” relates to short periods of time in which one state captures or makes incursions into another until their differences are resolved. Judea and Samaria, according to the argument from the right, has been under Israeli control for a long time and there seems to be no timetable for dispute resolution or expectation that Israel will simply withdraw. Essentially, the report concluded that Israel can treat the West Bank as if it were part of the internationally recognized state of Israel. Take note of a few problems:
If the West Bank and its settlements are part of Israel proper then the people currently living in the West Bank would be Israeli citizens with full political rights – regardless of religion or ethnicity. The slippery slope here is that the Palestinians of the West Bank would overwhelm the Jewish majority democracy and pose almost insurmountable political problems. The presence of the Palestinians in the West Bank, regardless of what one thinks of their political and cultural rights, will be a very difficult problem, a management and political problem, for the Israelis. Israel simply must get out of the business of lording over large numbers of people who are not Israelis. Again political nuances do not even matter much because the reality of managing large numbers of noncitizens is always a loser for the dominant culture.
It should be noted that there is nothing particularly new about this legal argument. Israeli legal scholars have attempted to justify Israel’s presence in the West Bank by arguing that it is not subject to the conditions of international law. Their arguments have not been accepted by most other legal scholars or the international community in general.
Third, trying to do something about occupation on the basis of international law is pretty futile. The Israeli Supreme Court has consistently ruled on the side of security arguments with respect to the West Bank. Those arguments have been tempered, and always subject to conditions, but have remained supportive of Israel’s presence. The court has, for example, allowed settlements but not on privately owned land; it has allowed targeted assassinations but only under specific conditions; it has even allowed Israel to use and sell natural resources in the West Bank.
Attitudes about the green line (see the Michael Freund article on the “articles of interest” tab on the top of this blog page) and the settlements are beginning to change in Israel. There is creeping support and sympathy for settlers. And a more casual and optimistic attitude about ownership of the West Bank is a byproduct of the diminished interest in the two state solution. If there is no genuine two state solution, then Israel might as well appropriate the land. As Israelis grow tired of dealing with the Palestinians their attitude about the West Bank becomes more predatory.
Egypt’s Inverted Pyramids
We will see what the future holds for Egypt, but I have trouble shaking the feeling that not much will change. The election of Mohammed Morsi has been hailed as the first democratically elected president of Egypt in its history, but after the dissolution of Parliament and the reemergence of the Egyptian military it remains unclear just how democratic Morsi’s election was. The political situation in Egypt remains precarious because of its assertive military, questionable legitimacy, political shenanigans, not to mention the “wait-and-see” attitude the world is taking with respect to the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood. When the parliament was dissolved the votes of about 30 million people were simply ignored. This is no way to run a democracy.
Morsi’s election was mishandled and the results were reliant on military arrests, a special constitutional declaration that gives the military greater power and increases their potential influence on any new Constitution. Clearly most good liberal Democrats around the world shudder at this sort of military power, but of course in Egypt it is the military that will keep the Muslim Brotherhood in check and that is probably more important.
The divisions in the Egyptian society are really quite deep. The military (essentially SCAF the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) spills over into executive power; there is no constitution so there is confusion about foundational principles; there is lack of clarity about the role of religion in government; and then there are the normal divisions of religious versus secular, modern and traditional, liberal versus conservative. The Egyptians must make progress toward consolidating their democracy and the transition to new leadership. Below are some issues relevant to this consolidation and directed towards stabilizing the Egyptian polity.
- Morsi is a well-known Muslim who clearly will not abandon his religious principles. This is why the selection of a Vice President who represents constituencies other than the Muslim Brotherhood would provide some welcome balance and an alternative voice. One of the lessons of democracy is that it relies on contestatory discourse not cohesion. The government of Egypt must continue to develop its skills, shall we say, with respect to incorporating and managing differences. It is also crucial that the work of writing a constitution be completed. The reorganization and redefinition of various governmental institutions can only take place within the context of constitutional political legitimacy.
- Along these lines, the Muslim brotherhood must support legal experts and those with contemporary interpretations of Islam with an eye toward greater inclusiveness and integration of contemporary issues into Islamic sensibilities. And Islamic political and religious organizations such as the brotherhood certainly have their own agenda which they seek to advance. But if the brotherhood is more interested in ideological purity than political pragmatism it will be a problem.
- The military has far too much power and this is always a dangerous situation, even though in the case of Egypt the military is holding Muslim Brotherhood in check as well as keeping the peace. The military is currently empowered to arrest and detain people without a warrant. This is not acceptable in a democracy. Moreover, the SCAF in particular must withdraw from public political activity. They currently justify their behavior because there is no constitution but this must change immediately upon completion of the constitution.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the military are the two most powerful Egyptian institutions and they must lead the way toward learning the habits of managing differences rather than imposing agendas. The international community will support Egyptian democratic transition in the form of foreign aid and support as long as Egypt can achieve the proper balance is between religion and democracy – difficult as that is. Egypt has a long and noble history that has prepared it more than others to accept the new democratic climate brought about by the Arab spring. They should be commended for the relatively peaceful protest and their engagement in the debates surrounding their own cultural change. At the moment the Egyptian pyramids have been turned on their pointed sides and are teetering: important changes are necessary so the strong and broad foundation that has sustained these pyramids for centuries can return to its rightful place.
Netanyahu, Leadership, and the Peace Process
After issues in a conflict are explored and analyzed, and after positions are established and defended, a leader needs to step forward and initiate new directions. The matter of leadership is sometimes underappreciated with respect to its role in solving difficult political conflicts. Conflicts require bold leaders who are able to set new directions and initiate solutions before his or her constituency is even sufficiently supportive. Benjamin Netanyahu has been a staunch conservative all of his life but even he has now admitted the possibility of a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is his chance to be a peacemaker; it might be his last chance to truly establish a positive lasting legacy that will accompany him into the future. But it is also possible that violence will soon break out in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza and derail any chance Netanyahu now has to be a peacemaker.
The formation of a unity government that includes Kadima was a brilliant move on Netanyahu’s part that makes it more possible for Netanyahu to pass legislation and, perhaps even more importantly, not be so dependent on the right wing parties. Netanyahu now controls enough seats in the Knesset to pass legislation and control an agenda. But this new coalition will require leadership. If the formation of a unity government merely allows Netanyahu to pass internal legislation and increases his control over his own party and the government then there will be little reason to believe in significant change with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also, some have suggested that a unity government is designed to increase the justification for an attack on Iran. Perhaps, but Israel is increasingly unconvinced that a preemptive attack on Iran is worthwhile or justifiable. We will see.
There is plenty of apathy and denial in the current peace talk environment. Many Europeans simply do not want to invest politically in the peace process, and many Israelis are “fed up.” Having just returned from 2 1/2 months in Israel, I can attest to the fact that Israelis are increasingly detached from the conflict as a result of many years of false starts, rejections, painful discussions, and the general lack of trust that characterizes the relationship between the two sides.
If Netanyahu simply wants to continue settling in the West Bank on the belief that the Palestinians will one day give up then his leadership legacy is in trouble. But if he uses a unity government as an opportunity to speak with a broader voice and represent a greater variety of people then his leadership will be a lifeline to Abbas and the Palestinians. But as of now, Netanyahu is doing little more than speaking to people without engaging in substantive deliberations or clear movement toward a final status.
The importance of the coming elections in the United States also cannot be underestimated. Israelis have a strong and intimate relationship with United States and they expect their leaders to maintain that relationship. There is one analysis floating around from 1999 when Netanyahu lost to Ehud Barak that a significant number of people voted against him because of his poor relationship with Clinton, mainly because Clinton accused him of another failure of leadership when he undermined the peace process. Given that the relationship between Obama and Netanyahu is even worse – because of Netanyahu’s condescending treatment of Obama – and not very easily fixable, Netanyahu feels it is necessary to broaden his base of support with a unity government.
It is probably true that the reasons for forming a unity government were more oriented toward internal politics than the peace process. Nevertheless, the unity government should have important diplomatic consequences if the leadership decides so. But Netanyahu must signal his interest – he must express his leadership. Otherwise it is pointless to talk about the peace process as long as Netanyahu is Prime Minister.
Finally, it’s important to note that Mofaz the leader of Kadima who joined Netanyahu’s government is associated with a hopeful interim peace plan that a number of people consider viable. This creates a Palestinian state with temporary borders (on the basis of the 2002 roadmap to which both Israelis and Palestinians agreed) and the possibility for a final status agreement. The formation of a unity government was smart on Netanyahu’s part, but if he wants to be really smart he will use the unity government to facilitate the peace process. That’s leadership.
Peace and Conflict Politics 