Top 10 Reasons Why the Palestinian UN Resolution Should Be Discouraged
Two posts ago on September 6, I wrote
that the Palestinians were frustrated and expressed a certain amount of
sympathy with his frustration. Numerous commentators and pundits have made
the same point. Yet it remains the case that the UN resolution to declare
Palestine a state is seriously problematic and going to cause more trouble than
it’s worth. The list below just briefly highlights the potential problems:
- It will void the Oslo agreement,
which held that all decisions must be the result of bilateral negotiations
between Israel and Palestine. Even though Oslo is moribund, it provides a
framework for discussion and expectations. Sets of agreements that have
stimulated cooperation (such as security) will be in jeopardy. - It will inflame both the Israelis
and the Palestinians (albeit for different reasons) but could still result in
violence. The proposed Palestinian state will be like no state imagined by
Israelis. It will make it difficult for Israelis to control their own religious
sites, settlement blocs, and various other resources. This declaration could
create a very difficult atmosphere that triggers an Israeli or a Palestinian
backlash. - Whatever borders the resolution
declares will automatically define Israel as an occupier with no jointly
recognized outlets for resolution. But on the Palestinian side it would fix
their boundaries and make future boundary negotiations difficult. A unilateral
declaration of any boundary is by nature illegitimate. - The Palestinians will give up
their claim of being a stateless people, a status that has benefited them. The
Palestinians lose their international moral standing if the conflict becomes one
of simply border disputes. The PLO, according to one Palestinian consultant,
will lose its legal status as a representative of the Palestinian people. After
a state is declared refugees outside the boundaries of that state would be left
without recourse. - There is at this moment minimal
unity between Hamas and Fatah and hence the Palestinian state will include
about 40% of the West Bank. This leaves portions of the West Bank, East
Jerusalem, and Gaza, in the hands of Hamas. This is nothing but a combustible
situation that could explode at any time. - Interestingly, it is the Israelis
who have typically been blamed for acting unilaterally. It is now the
Palestinians who are acting unilaterally and if they set expectations that
cannot be met and the situation will be even worse. - The current security on the
ground is a real success for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is essential
for any progress and has been the result of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. If
the UN resolution results in the loss of this cooperation, then everyone’s
efforts will have been in vain. - It’s curious that in 2003 the
Palestinians were offered the opportunity to establish the state first, and
negotiate final status agreements later. They rejected this proposal because
they figured that they would lose negotiating power by establishing a state
without final status issues being resolved. Now, they have reversed course and
are pursuing this very goal but doing it outside the confines of agreements
with others. This seems to be to their own disadvantage. - The majority of Israelis support
a two state solution. The two state solution is very important and the only
sensible solution which can guarantee the national identity and dignity of both
sides. But such a solution must be the result of direct negotiations and
agreements between Israelis and Palestinians. This unilateral action
jeopardizes the two state solution, and might cause an Israeli diminution of
support. - Finally,
Israel puts its friend the United States in a difficult position and increases
the alienation and isolation from the Arab world. But the Palestinians are also
alienating a potential friend in the United States. Currently, the US is more
supportive of Palestinian interests than ever before. This unilateral
resolution interferes with the Palestinian US relationship.
Palestinian frustration with Israel –
Netanyahu in particular and the right-wing coalition – is justified. And the
two state solution is the only way to preserve the idea of real peace. It’s
crucial that the two states be established and Israel begin the process of
developing itself as a Jewish state alongside the Palestinians. The existence
of two states serves the interests of both parties – not to mention the
positive implications for the Middle East and the world. The two sides must
find a path back to negotiations, paths that cross one another and do not head
off on their own.
Next week, a modest solution proposal.
The Coming Islamic Empire
Let me describe a few realities and you
tell me the common explanatory factor. First, the Israeli Embassy in Cairo is attacked
and the Israeli government sends jet fighters to evacuate the ambassador and
his staff members. Protesters stormed the Israeli Embassy and significantly
damaged the building. Turkey has expelled the Israeli ambassador and used the
flotilla incident as evidence of its damaged relationship with Israel.
Netanyahu presides over and intransient right-wing coalition that has paralyzed
him. He cannot maintain his government unless he placates this coalition and
that prevents him from conciliation, negotiation, and movement toward the two-state
solution. The Palestinians are going to the United Nations to have the UN declare
the Palestinian state. It seems as if no amount of pressure from the United
States will stop them. Israel is increasingly isolated and the declaration of a
Palestinian state by the General Assembly is likely to cause violence,
confusion, and release a hornet’s nest of attacks on Israel as the Palestinians
gain access to United Nations resources such as the International Criminal Court.
The declaration of a Palestinian state –
even an observer state – will be nothing less than deadly for the peace
process. Israel will not recognize the conditions of the state and a half
million Israelis who live outside the recognized boundaries of Israel proper, but
inside the geography of the new Palestinian state, will be classified as
occupiers. As the relationship between the PLA and Israel deteriorates, and
their mutual security agreements fail, the PLA will slip into the hands of Hamas.
This cascade of events will result in an even worse situation in the Middle
East than is presently the case. What explains it? It is explained by the
coming Arab Muslim Empire.
The tumult in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria,
all of which is supposed to be associated with an Arab Spring, has offered a
reality in striking contrast to expectations and images of a fledgling
democracy. Whether it be Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Libya, or Tunisia it is
possible in every case to result in the rise of Islam. And even if dictators
and brutal leaders in Egypt, Libya, and Syria needed to be ousted the
alternative might not be very satisfying. And the not so invisible hand of Iran
is in the shadows of the background.
We have seen this all before: military
leaders enriching themselves; a few elites pulling the strings of power; inept
and incompetent state institutions; whining blame reserved for other cultures,
mostly Western; and the humiliation associated with the Palestinian situation.
In the earlier part of this century revolutions led to dictatorial leaders,
emancipatory political ideologies such as Marxism, and military rule. But this time
it is going to be Islam that is the big winner. Mark my words, Egypt is not
going to be ruled in the future by the enlightened young Facebook intellectuals
responsible for the revolution and who looked good on television. These people
do not fit the model of traditional communities; they will be out maneuvered by
stronger and more organized religious forces.
As Robert Malley and Hussein Agha argued
in the New York Review of Books,
“Islamists of various tendencies are coming in from the cold.”
Islamists are the largest group in all of these cultures and the best
organized. They have been silenced and repressed in the past but a little
democratic air will allow them to breathe more freely. There was an outcry when
Hamas won democratic elections in Gaza in 2006, but the same is true of
democratic elections as is freedom of speech – in for a dime, in for a dollar:
If we’re going to accept democratic elections as legitimate expressions of the
polity then we have to accept outcomes we don’t prefer. Islamic groups played an
important behind-the-scenes role in Libya, Egypt, and in Syria. They provide a
moral code that speaks to the population and will certainly be the primary
warrant for arguments about the political future of these cultures.
And Islamic parties will probably play
it smart. They will have learned that presenting themselves as Jihadists would
be a mistake and will likely do the opposite; that is, explain to the world
that they are the best defense against Jihadism. The US has dreamt of
democratic forces taking a stronger foothold but we will be mostly
disappointed. And even though the liberal democratic culture of the United
States is quite divergent from conservative Islamic cultures, we will be in a
better position than Israel to curry favor with these new developments. Still,
our political and democratic sympathies lay with Israel whose future in the
Arab world will be beset on all sides by the forces of difficulty.
The Palestinians Are Nothing If Not Frustrated
In 1998 the then Defense Minister Ehud
Barak was asked by the journalist Gideon Levy what he would do if you were a
Palestinian. Barak answered that he would have joined a terrorist group and be
protesting in the streets. Barak’s answer caused quite a stir in Israel, but it
does represent the deep but unspoken identification with Palestinian
frustration. And Israelis apparently never held it against him because Barak
beat Netanyahu in the elections of 1999.
Even the most persistent defender of
Israel, and I count myself among them, must sympathize with Palestinian
frustrations and the extent to which they have been blocked at every legitimate
avenue. Who can blame them for looking to the U.N ( Palestinians go to the UN) for some sort of
recognition and approval? If Ehud Barak’s identification with the Palestinian
cause is so strong that he would have joined a terrorist group, surely he
appreciates the effort at recognition from the United Nations. Just look at the
obstacles the Palestinians have had to overcome. I am not, mind you, excusing Palestinian
violence and political ineptitude. But if Mahmoud Abbas is to be given any
credit at all, if there’s anything at all genuine about his efforts at state
building and negotiating with the Israelis then he deserves our sympathy.
The peace process is dead and even if it
were still breathing it probably lacks the strength to sustain itself. The
peace process has not maintained Palestinian national aspirations, nor has it
significantly impeded Israeli settlements. After 25 years of trying to achieve
peace the Palestinians are besieged by frustration and failure. Seeking some
sort of “win” by going to the United Nations is a therapeutic act.
And both Israel and the United States
have been nothing but bumbling and unsuccessful at making any sort of progress
in the peace process. The UN recognition gambit is born of nothing but
frustration by the Palestinians who remain Balkanized and politically anemic.
The US has failed to mediate the conflict and cannot reconcile its support for
both Israel and the need for a two state solution. The decision to seek
recognition by the United Nations stimulated the reconciliation of the PLA and
Hamas. I wrote in an earlier post (see June 25, 2011) that this might not be
such a bad idea, and is probably inevitable, but it does complicate matters.
Hamas is a recognized terrorist organization and makes dealing with United
States and Israel even more difficult.
Moreover, the Palestinian political
situation could become even more volatile. The PLO may have once represented
the “glorious Palestinian resistance”, but to many young Palestinians
they are also the old guard who are failing to accomplish political goals.
These young Palestinians are more committed to political ideals then to
political parties.
The Palestinians are seeking membership
in the UN as a state. The political question about what actually constitutes a
state is a little slippery but typically involves four conditions including a
population, a territory, governing institutions, and the ability to engage in
international relations. None of these conditions are met to the full
satisfaction of everyone but they all are probably “good enough.” Still,
the United Nations is not going to take close measurement of these four
conditions and make some sort of rational technical vote. Even though everyone
expects the Security Council to veto the Palestinian bid, it will pass easily
in the General Assembly even though it is nonbinding. The United States will
veto the Palestinian bid in the Security Council and once again maintain its
support of Israel while voting against its interests with respect to solving
the Israeli-Palestinian problem.
The consequences for Israel are surely
negative. Israel will once again be criticized and delegitimized and be on the
losing end of the General Assembly vote. In fact, it will be a wipeout as most
countries in the world will support the recognition of the Palestinians as a
state. The Palestinian bid will define itself as having borders along 1967
borders, establish increased legitimacy for its weak political institutions,
and make all sorts of UN resources available to the newly recognized state.
There have been agreements on none of these issues between Palestine and Israel
and the tension between the two will be exacerbated rather than diminished. It
is true that the Palestinian recognition by the UN will be symbolic, but that
does not mean unimportant.
The consequences of this international
political move by the Palestinians remain unclear. It involves some serious
risks that include increased confrontation with Israel, the United States, and
the failure of the peace process. But one thing is clear – Palestinian
frustration.
The Changing Discourse on the Status of Jerusalem
When there is
a permanent status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians it is very
unlikely that one side will live under the sovereignty of the other in
Jerusalem. The discourse about Jerusalem has been changing and for the worse
because it is slipping into a religious issue rather than one of territorial
agreement. There is little doubt that Jerusalem is a volatile matter that
divides the Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, no end of conflict or final
status agreement is going to exclude one side from claiming Jerusalem as its
capital. As of now, Jerusalem and its symbolic value is making the conflict
more difficult to grapple with and pushing the two sides even further apart.
There are a couple of reasons for this.
Settlers have
increased their presence in the neighborhoods around Jerusalem. There are more
settlers in places like Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah than ever before. The number
of these settlers has been growing and they are fast approaching a critical
mass that will make them difficult to extract. They will probably have to be
removed from their neighborhoods and that means violence. Their presence and the
willingness of the Israeli government to tolerate them is simply raising the
price Israel will have to pay for a final settlement.
Second, as
settlers and new Israeli neighborhoods pop up borders and dividing lines become
more difficult to identify. Some of these new neighborhoods have been built on
contested land and supported with private money. They are not likely to be
included in a final settlement and will make discussion of boundaries even more
difficult. The longer it takes to develop a two state solution the more complex
and convoluted the situation becomes. With the current pace of new
neighborhoods and arguments over geography, the situation on the ground in
Jerusalem will be so Balkanized that a solution will be impossible.
Jerusalem
drips with significance, symbolism, and identity. An agreement that completely
satisfies both sides seems unattainable; hence, both sides must negotiate and
try to find a satisfactory agreement. The most common suggestions are:
- a special joint arrangement –
with neither side declaring sovereignty – that has the two sides sharing the
city. Religious, historical, and cultural sites would be under the purview of
an international community charged with guaranteeing the safety and integrity
of the sites. Freedom of worship would be guaranteed. This is essentially a
compromise based on “sharing” Jerusalem with international
involvement. Such an agreement seems “sensible” and
“rational” but it undercuts the strength of the identity relationship
that Palestinians and Israelis ascribed to Jerusalem. Many Israelis could not
stomach the thought that Jerusalem in its full sense was not their sovereign capital
and homeland. The same is true for Palestinians. - a geographic division of the city
whereby Israel controls and has sovereignty over its neighborhoods and
Palestinians have control over theirs. This would require serious and difficult
negotiation the results of which would be that every inch of land would have to
be measured and parsed into either Israeli or Palestinian categories. The
success of such negotiations seems doubtful. This solution does satisfy the
sovereignty question, but only to a limited extent. Each side would have full
control (both political and administrative) over its own areas, but whether or
not this is satisfactory depends on the acceptability of the geographic
divisions. - the city is recognized as the
capital of both Israel and Palestine and the two sides share political and
administrative control. This is a desirable solution but one that requires the
sort of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians that they are now not
capable of.
Treating
Jerusalem as a sacred holy place rather than a negotiable geographic area makes
the discourse about Jerusalem more rigid and less susceptible to influence.
Moreover, it’s easy to talk about land swaps or exchanges, but such discussions
about geographical divisions must be of comparative value. The entire
definition of “what is Jerusalem” remains contested. Land currently
on the outskirts of what is considered Jerusalem could simply be annexed and
defined as Jerusalem. But the matter of comparative value will rear its head.
The Holy Basin (Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif) is certainly “worth”
more than any other neighborhood Jerusalem.
Earlier in the
history of the discourse around Jerusalem, Israel could have ceded East
Jerusalem to the Palestinians and allowed them to establish a capital. But
there has been recent settlement activity in East Jerusalem creating new facts
on the ground and making things more complicated. After annexing East Jerusalem
in 1967, Israel declared Jerusalem as its eternal capital. The Palestinians –
along with a few UN resolutions – do not recognize this declaration. Herein lays
the starting point for conflict resolution.
Why You Will Die for Your Ethnic Group But Not Your Book Club
Political systems
that tolerate and manage diversity are among the most sophisticated and
evolved. Even if there is a tendency toward maximizing self-interest, and
favoring one’s group, modern theory assumes that such narrow interests can be
“learned away.” In other words, the skills and habits of
multiculturalism and diversity will supersede the harsher consequences of
narrow tribal identity. Such assumptions are the foundation of conflict
resolution.
On August 14,
2011 the New York Times reported a
story about how the Dutch are confronting the question of their own identity in
the face of rising fear of Muslims and the right wing anti-immigration
political party of Geert Wilders. The Dutch have a long history of tolerance
and political liberalism so the racism and hate speech circulating in their
culture is alien to them. But the Dutch cohesion and social solidarity has been
based on a history of cultural and ethnic homogenization. It is easy to enforce
rules of behavior on large groups of people when everyone is alike. In
relatively small groups composed of people with similar values and attitudes it
is easy to produce social cohesion and consistency.
But now the Dutch
are faced with social and religious groups in their society that are different
from the dominant group. Now it is time for the test of Dutch political
liberalism. Tolerating diversity has been so easy for the Dutch for so long
that they have forgotten the power of group identity. They have forgotten that
humans developed an evolutionary advantage by recognizing and favoring their
own group. The evolution of Dutch social graces and tolerance means that most
members of Dutch culture do not talk about ethnicity and race. But no one
objects to the hateful things that Wilders says, and a number of those
interviewed in the New York Times
article stated that Wilders was only saying what most people think. The Dutch
are struggling with group identity and will have to relearn its power. It is
group identity that justifies extreme and violent behavior.
Ever wonder
why there is such a long line of people waiting to blow themselves up? How
could it be that anyone except the most crazed outlier can strap Centex to his
waist and blow himself up? There are so many terrorists in the form of suicide
bombers that we have to conclude that any “normal” person is capable
of becoming a terrorist. Individuals in groups that have been frustrated or
insulted in some way are capable of expressing the most extreme anger. A frustrated
and threatened group identity (such as the Dutch identity threatened by Islam)
is far more dangerous than a threatened individual identity. It is the
identification with a group or cause that is the most potent explanatory factor
here.
The incendiary
power of group identity is clear. A terrorist will do unspeakable things in the
name of their group or cause that they would not consider doing for personal
reasons. I should add that the benevolent and compassionate person who is
motivated to self-sacrifice (the medal of honor winner who dives on a hand
grenade) is no different than the terrorist when it comes to powerful group
identification. Rick McCauley in The
Psychology of Terrorism explains these processes and clarifies how
terrorists are typically not poor, miserable, and uneducated. They know what
they are doing and do it willingly.
Group identity
(either ethnic, religious, or political) has the evolutionary advantage of
providing safety as well as obvious reproductive opportunities. But ethnic
identity is particularly potent. It represents a long history of the
convergence of interests. Numerous classical studies of group formation have
demonstrated how easy it is to form a group identity. That’s why people
identify so strongly and so easily with sports teams, organizations, clubs, or
any number of social and economic groups. But ethnic groups are a principal
source of values and individual identity. The fact that states and political
systems have so much trouble incorporating ethnic groups into the state is one
example of the strength of this identification. People will tolerate unjust
economic conditions, but will react violently if their ethnic group is
humiliated or dishonored in some way.
I will close
by pointing out that ethnicity is discussed in academic circles these days as subject
to the vagaries of interaction and a social construction. It is true enough
that people are not “born” with group identities. One does not emerge
from the womb as an “Irish nationalist,” or a “Norwegian,”
or a “Red Sox fan.” But one does emerge from the womb determined to
develop group identities. And the most basic group identities are based on what
we see immediately in front of us – gender and physiology. That’s why gender
and ethnic group identities are so powerful. And that’s why people will die for
their ethnic group, but not their book club.
Can Israel be a Jewish State and Not Discriminate Against the Arab Minority
The word on
the street in Israel is that Palestinians don’t have much problem with Israel
being a “Jewish state” but they do have problems with the Zionist
enterprise. Of course, they won’t recognize Israel as a Jewish state just yet
and refuse to recognize its existence as such. This is some sort of symbolic
denial of Israel and silly in many ways because the partition in 1947 was
designed to create a Jewish state. The whole idea of Israel doesn’t make much
sense if it’s not Jewish. And some day in the distant future when and if there
is truly an end of conflict Israel will be known as a “Jewish state.”
The conflict
is heavily driven by the Arab refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
And even though many Palestinians have more problems with Zionism than Judaism,
they use the denial of Israel as a Jewish state strategically to argue for the
rights of Arab citizens. By denying the Jewish nature of the state they leave
the door open for a Palestinian population that will continue to burrow into
the state of Israel. Palestinians have a strong argument in human rights. About
20% of the population of Israel is Arab and they cannot be denied basic human
rights.
An interesting
debate emerges, however, by posing the question as to whether or not Israel
being a “Jewish state” automatically means discrimination against
others. Can Israel be a Jewish state and not discriminate against the Arab
minority? Well, probably not in the purest sense. Activist Palestinians use
this point quite regularly; that is, they make the argument that if Israel is
Jewish it will mean discrimination against its minority citizens. There are two
problems and inconsistencies here.
First, what
does “discrimination” mean? That will depend on how Jewish the state
is. If it is an Orthodox Torah state then discrimination will be considerable
against everybody. But let’s assume Israel becomes a “reasonable”
Jewish state that recognizes Jewish history and culture but still makes the distinction
between the public and private sphere. In other words, anyone will be able to
practice their own religion and culture within the private confines of their
own home. The state will make certain accommodations for Judaism such as rules
of kashrut, the Sabbath, the calendar, cultural touch points such as street
names, religious holidays, education, and the like. The United States certainly
is not a Christian state but Christian influences are pervasive. School
calendars, government offices, and institutional life all respond to Christian
traditions. As a Jewish state, public schools in Israel will teach some Jewish
history and Zionism. But the matter of private schools and whether or not it
will be possible to avoid the state religion will be debatable. There is a
distinction between discrimination and differences. Just because two groups are
different does not mean one is discriminated against.
It is also
curious that this problem emerges with respect to the Jewish state of Israel
with little or no mention of other religious states. This is an easy point to
make: a number of countries contain the name of the religion in the name of the
country such as the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. Turkey is increasingly an Islamic country even with its secular
military tradition. Jordan’s constitution says that no one can be king who is
not Muslim and this includes converts. All of these countries have minorities,
and to be sure they’re not treated very well, but these countries also come
from different political and cultural histories. They do not have Israel’s
history of democracy and equal rights, a history that should serve them well as
Israel works out these issues.
Other
countries with more democratic traditions such as Denmark, Norway, in England
also have institutionalized religious identities. The Queen of England is the
guardian of Anglican Christianity. The Danes and Norwegians are all part of an
official Church of Denmark and Norway and these are countries that do not
receive the brunt of the world’s criticism.
The problem of Israel being a “Jewish”
state is really very minor. It is true that the legal aspects of certain
minority rights have yet to be argued through, but these problems should not be
insurmountable. And although conservatives in Israel are increasingly trying to
limit civil rights in an effort to ensure the Jewish nature of the state
through legislation, Israel still has no religious test to hold major office
and the Israeli Supreme Court has a strong tradition of guaranteeing human
rights. I understand that some have fundamental objections to any state with an
official religion, but this is a challenge for another time.
True Deliberation and Conflict Resolution
Conflict transformation is concerned with relationships.
This includes both face-to-face interactions and the ways in which we structure
our social, political, economic, and cultural relationships. It is
communicative in nature because conflict transformation focuses on interaction
and communicative processes associated with evolving change. Ethnopolitical
conflicts almost always involve intercultural exchanges and the problems
associated with managing the distortions that result from ingroup-outgroup relationships.
And deliberation is a democracy building activity, along with being a moral,
political, and decision making process that facilitates conflict resolution. My argument here is that the deliberative process can
produce productive change and can draw on existing social psychological and
communication theories to explain how this change occurs.
The essence of
deliberative communication is to transform preferences of conflicting parties in
order to account for the point of view of others. As scholars such as Dryzek
explain, preferences must be transformed in the interaction. The communication
between conflicting parties is organized around the idea of building a common
good. This is the essence of change from a deliberative perspective. Its
transformative capacity is measured by the amount of change from one side to
the other and the epistemic quality of decisions. Deliberative communication
can best be transformative when a diversity of participants has access to each
other in a public sphere of some sort. This maximizes subjectivity and is important because subjectivity is an anecdote
to undue influence from sources of power that seek to manipulate the process
for their own interests. Subjectivity guarantees the inclusion of multiple
perspectives.
But
deliberative discussion utilizes principles of communication designed to pool
considerations in order to form higher quality decisions and produce both
individual and decision-making changes that are more significant. Deliberation
differs from arguing because argument is designed to win others over to the
speaker’s side. In deliberation, participants act to engage each other’s
considerations in order to derive new possibilities. Although deliberation does
not always work, it has been shown to be associated with significant changes
with respect to improved decision quality, opinion quality, understanding the
other side, and other individual benefits. The better argument is most cited
reason for the success of deliberation. But even quality arguments, if they
have any chance at all of becoming common beliefs, must capture attention and
remain foregrounded in memory. This is one reason other rhetorical and
communicative issues factor into the success or failure of the deliberative
process. There is an important distinction between deliberation and argument such
that in deliberation reasons precede opinions; that is, in genuine deliberation
one’s opinions are not formed yet and they process reasons in the service of
developing quality opinions. In the case of argument one expresses opinions and
then reasons follow in defense of those opinions. The reasons-opinions
distinction is important for the epistemic quality of deliberation. The act of
deliberation – weighing reasons before forming an opinion – causes people to
think more intensely and deeply about reasons thus producing reasoning of
higher quality. Giving reasons simply to defend already expressed opinion is
unrelated to deriving new ideas and less complex. The expectation of
open-mindedness improves the likelihood of behaving deliberatively.
Terror in Norway: What to Remember about the Relationship between Terror and the Media
Anders Breivik
gunned down dozens of young people and blew up a building all in the name of
“Norwegian ethnicity,” “Christianity,” and “Muslim fear.”
It is important to remember that these are group categories and capable of
producing the greatest violence. We sometimes think of modern terrorists as
outlaws perpetrating violence for their own ends, but these terrorists usually
have larger political goals, and are more strategic than we think. They
consciously manipulate the media, and violence is the mechanism they used to do
so. As terrorists specialists have pointed out for some time now (e.g. McCauley),
terrorism is not best understood as an individual pathology. In fact, terrorism
would be easier to handle and understand if it were an individual pathology. It
would be easier to identify the individuals and prevent their terrorism. Their
behavior would be more predictable and they would be easier to catch.
No, terrorism
is a strategy. It is instrumental violence. It is violence in the service of a
goal and in some way the violence has been legitimated. It is not a pathological
behavior carried out for the pure pleasure of the perpetrator. Anders Breivik had
broader political objectives. His first request in court was to represent
himself and have the opportunity to speak. He is trying to manipulate the media
in the service of his political manifesto. Studies have reported the
correlation between the rise in terrorism and the availability of media. More
broadcast outlets are associated with more terrorism, especially dramatic and
high concept terrorism that attracts attention.
Terrorism has
two primary strategies: the first is a psychological impact on the enemy. Breivik
wanted the Norwegian people to “wake up.” He was trying to
“warn” the world about an impending danger. Blowing up buildings and
killing innocent citizens has very little material effect, but its psychological
impact is enormous. Terrorists need the media for these psychological effects.
The second strategy is to mobilize the terrorists’ own supporters. Even if
other supportive individuals do not engage in terrorist acts, they will
sympathize. This sympathy is also a goal. Breivik wanted to arouse the
Norwegian people from their slumber and expand the level of sympathy for his
cause.
Terrorists
such as Breivik use violence as a “communication strategy.” They have
an important relationship with the media, and are reliant on them for exposure;
they want others to ultimately embrace their cause. Modern terrorists are
sophisticated in that they want more than buildings simply blown up. Terrorists
need the media to damage their enemy, both psychologically and materially. But
governments also use the media to communicate to terrorist organizations. They
want to present themselves as in control and use the media to present favorable
images of strength and determination.
When
terrorists want to take credit for violence the media are in the untenable
position of assisting them. They can be easily used as dupes. The media need to
protect the public’s information rights, but not at the expense of assisting
terrorism. Moreover, when the public knows little about a particular terrorist
group they turn their attention to the media who report on the terrorist group
and increase the public’s understanding. Consequently, it is not uncommon for
the public to express a certain amount of sympathy for the terrorist group
agenda, even though the public condemns violence.
And, as much
as terrorists depend on media attention, they can also be exposed by the media.
Investigative journalists can get close to discovering and exposing terrorists
and thus put themselves in danger. The Committee to Protect Journalists (www.cpj.org)
reports a steady upward trend in the murder of journalists in the last two
decades.
Terrorism has a close relationship with modern
media. Over the years terrorists have refine their communication skills. Weimann
probably best captures the essence of terrorism by equating it with a
theatrical performance, complete with scripts, actors, and stage management.
The young people murdered by Breivik were actors in his script. He put on his
police uniform costume and played the role of avenger warning the townspeople
of the coming storm of Muslim immigrants. Breivik played his role successfully because
he is now reaching larger audiences.
The Flotilla Affair: The Ship of Fools
Listen to Dr. Harvey Jassem’s interview concerning the flotilla.
Jassem interview about flotilla
The radio interview above is worth
listening to because it gives good perspective on Israel and issues related to
Gaza. Some students at a campus radio station reported positively on the
flotilla incident, and Professor Jassem in the interview above provides a
little balance.
The flotilla spectacle seems to be
fading. The UN’s inquiry into the incident last year found that Israel’s
blockade was legal. But what’s even more important is that a crude attempt to
diminish Israel has been stopped. The flotilla activists, wrapped in their
symbolic kafiyehs, have had the wind taken from their sail as participants have
bailed out. It’s important to underscore that the flotilla was never about
human rights. It was about trying to embarrass Israel. Actually, I always
chuckled at the slogan referring to “liberating Gaza.” Liberating
Gaza from what? Hamas? Fine, have a good time. The organizers were also
embarrassed by the regular disclosures of the connections between Hamas and the
flotilla organizers. Some Dutch journalists reportedly pulled out after having
discovered the extent of Hamas’s involvement in the flotilla stunt.
This is another one of those situations
where some people end up defending barbarism. Moreover, many of them are
hopelessly uninformed. They actually believe Gaza is under Israeli occupation,
when Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005. Others will claim that it is only the
blockade that they are protesting, and Israel is denying medical supplies and
humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza. Again, this is a simple falsehood because
Israel allows all sorts of aid and supplies into Gaza, but does have security
issues. Israel simply must be sure that only aid and humanitarian supplies are
finding their way into the hands of the Gazan leaders – namely, Hamas. If these
human rights activists really cared about helping the downtrodden, there are
numerous other places in the world they would be traveling.
The issues that define the conflict
between Israelis and the Palestinians are complex enough. It simply is not
helpful when one group tries to turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a
world conflict, or a conflict between Israel and the world. Although any
thinking person realizes that the flotilla is designed to delegitimize Israel
rather than provide humanitarian aid, it is nice to know that various legal and
international groups have supported Israel on this matter. Israel remains in
the security dilemma; that is, it cannot ignore the rockets and violence aimed
toward Israel from the Gaza Strip. Yet, the more Israel responds by maintaining
its own security, the more it exacerbates the problem.
Benny Morris, writing in the National Interest, explains the origins of the relationship
between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey’s current role in the flotilla incident.
Ben-Gurion early in the history of Israel decided to reach out to the region’s
non-Arab and non-Islamic states such as Turkey. Hence, the relationship between
the State of Israel and Turkey over the decades began to mature and develop
into full diplomatic relations. But the recent rise of an Islamic government in
Turkey has changed all that. Turkey had become a source of support for the
flotilla. But the US is not happy with the turn of events in Turkey, and Turkey
would still like to appeal to US interests. There is some speculation that the
US has tried to cool Turkey’s involvement in the flotilla. Thus, the second
flotilla will not float.
Democracy and Intractable Conflicts
Learn about five dangerous ideas and conflict
Conflicts
involving religion and ethnicity, along with the host of economic and political
issues, are the most deep-rooted and difficult. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is not about religion, but religion lurks in the background and is
implicated. Still, one important implication for intractable conflicts is that
simple negotiable material interests are less important than the recognition of
basic needs, and these needs such as religious and identity confirmation are
entrenched and not subject to negotiation. And to make things even more
complex, these needs are not subject to the traditional models of conflict
management; that is, they are not satisfiable within a framework of bargaining,
negotiation, third-party interventions, or expressions of authority. Most of
these models, especially the use of authority or force, will make things worse
and entrench cultural attitudes even more deeply. But the good news is that
intelligence can be applied to these issues and there are strategies for making
progress on satisfying the basic needs of the two parties. Within a proper
respectful political framework, and with sufficient cultural knowledge and
sensitivity, a zero-sum negotiation can be turned into an integrated solution
that meets the needs and interests of both sides.
Changing
groups in conflict can involve interventions on numerous levels of analysis. Political
scientists might design institutional arrangements conducive to democratic or
citizen rights and these institutions will have a “trickle-down”
effect such that they affect individual psychologies and attitudes. But the
political science approach remains primarily interested in political
institutions. The same is true for a relational and communication approach. The
entry point might be individual psychologies or group relations but as these
change and development they will influence expectations about larger social
structures. Deep-rooted intractable conflicts can benefit from political
arrangements designed to foster equality and democratic values, but such
intractable conflicts begin with distorted relational and psychological
patterns that result in what Bar
Tal and Teichman (2005) called the “ethos of conflict.” A
conflict ethos is a repertoire of stereotypes, images, myths, and societal
beliefs that constitute a relationship between two conflicting parties that
defines how they perceive one another and how they communicate. The conflict
ethos is coherent and implies attitudes toward the two groups that legitimize
the ingroup and delegitimize the outgroup. This ingroup-outgroup contrast
fosters integration in one’s own society – albeit integration based on
distorted understandings – and various dangerous misperceptions of the other
society. The conflict ethos can be clustered around eight societal beliefs most
associated with resistant intractable conflicts. A fuller development of these
ideas appears in Bar Tal and Teichman (2005).
I
would add that this repertoire of beliefs applies equally well to the
generalized conflict between the West and Islam. We live in a historical period
characterized by the perception of a clear divide between the West and the
Muslim world. This is captured in Samuel Huntington’s unfortunate but appealing
phrase referring to the “clash of civilizations.” The strength and
depth of this divide between the West and the Islamic world is evidenced by the
outrage over events such as the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten printing the
Mohammed cartoons in 2005. The subsequent violence reproduces the perception of
dichotomous cultures. The “conflict” between East and West is usually
described in intractable terms. Each of these below plays an important role in
conflict resolution. They must be the subject of discussion, moderation,
adaptation. They are issues ideally for the public sphere as well as the macro
political realm of institution creation.
The
first primary theme of intractable conflicts is the sense that your own cause is just. Both
Palestinians and Israelis believe that their version of history and the conflict
are correct and worthy of support. Muslims believe their religious tenets
produce “justice” in the eyes of God, just as Americans believe
strongly in democracy and its encouragement. Americans and Muslims, as well as
Palestinians and Israelis, will shed much “blood and treasure” for
the justice of their cause. Secondly conflicting parties stressed the
importance of security. The Israelis
feel existentially threatened. They are convinced that the enemy is committed
to their destruction. Palestinians invoke the language of occupation to justify
their own violence. Security discourse is harnessed to justify any sort of
violence. Security is a basic human need and an easy rationale for the
legitimization of violence. Third is a powerful sense of patriotism where group members attach themselves to country and
land fusing the identity of both to individual identities. Without a powerful
internalized sense of patriotism group members will not sacrifice. Patriotism
mobilizes members of intractable conflicts in the face of heavy costs both
human and material. The United States has experienced a surge in patriotism and
identification with soldiers as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The fourth is unity or the
expectation of agreement in the face of the threat. This creates pressures to
conform to your own societal group and discourages disagreement that might be
an impediment to the cause. The fifth element of the conflict ethos is the
discourse of peace. Each group in the
conflict expresses themselves in utopian and vague terms with respect to peace.
This discourse maintains the image of the peace loving society, and encourages
support for one’s group, but rarely takes the form of the hard work and
sacrifices relevant to true peace. Victimization
is a sixth quality of intractable conflicts and a powerful psychological
self-image that emphasizes group vulnerability and the evil intentions of the
opponent. Israelis have a long history of victimization, and Palestinians have
developed the victim image that garners international sympathy. The seventh
quality of intractable conflicts is a belief that reflects ethnocentric attitudes about your own group. The culture develops a
positive self image and sees itself as moral and heroic as it confronts a less
than human enemy. The United States has demonized Islam and regularly
characterizes the religion as “unevolved.” Finally, there is a very
sharp set of beliefs concerning negative
qualities of the adversary. Stereotypes, poor communication, and
psychological distortions compose society’s image of the other.
These societal characteristics are deep rooted and
require serious analysis and consideration. Democratizing the conflict
resolution process is one way to approach these problems. More on how to do
that in coming posts.
Peace and Conflict Politics 