The Power of Communicative Contact
In the movie American History X Edward Norton plays a racist skinhead who goes to jail for killing two African-Americans who tried to rob his house. In prison the Norton character is assigned laundry duties with an African American. As a result, they form an interpersonal relationship and the Edward Norton character is transformed with an expanded view of humanity. Fresh out of prison he returns home to prevent his younger brother from making the same mistakes.
How realistic is this? Is this really the way to reduce prejudice and diminish conflict between groups? Is it typical to have a pleasant interpersonal relationship with a member of another group and then have those positive feelings generalize to all members of the group? It turns out that this is pretty much how it works. It is not typically the case that cordial relations with particular individuals are limited to that context only.
Below is sort of a straightforward summary of the research in this area known as the contact hypothesis. I offer it up here because I believe it is so important. In an earlier post I asked whether or not I was naïve about the power of communication. It turns out that I am not and the research strongly supports this. Intergroup contact does decrease intergroup bias. True, there are conditions in which intergroup contact can increase prejudice and hostility, but this is not very common especially if the contact experience is properly controlled.
In their book, When Groups Meet: the Dynamics of Intergroup Contact, Pettigrew and Tropp organize and summarize the literature on contact. My comments below rely on the research reported in the Pettigrew and Tropp book and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in these issues. One of the first questions to answer is whether or not a quality individual interpersonal relationship with a member of an outgroup generalizes to the entire outgroup. In other words, if an Israeli Jew has a friendly relationship with a Palestinian Arab will that affect the Israeli Jew’s more general attitude about Palestinian Arabs as a group? This is an issue of levels of analysis, or whether or not contact effects transfer. It turns out that they do. Pettigrew and Tropp’s analysis provides strong evidence that positive contact with an individual member of an outgroup generalizes to the outgroup as a whole.
Even more specifically, intergroup contact generalizes to an entire outgroup when that outgroup is a salient or particularly important category. The effects of contact are strongest when the participants are seen as typical members of the group and when membership in a group is important. So, if I am in a communicative relationship with a member of an outgroup and we are talking about issues that perhaps separate us because of our different group memberships, then our group identification has become particularly salient. Under these conditions I am more likely to generalize my experiences to a group beyond my immediate interpersonal relationship.
The next question becomes how do situations affect my interpretations and relationships with others. This is a standard question in the social sciences. Does it matter if I have contact with an outgroup member at work, social event, or neighborhood? Pettigrew and Tropp’s rigorous meta-analysis confirms that attitude change resulting from contact in one situation generalizes to another. This is additional evidence that positive interactive relationships have positive effects beyond the original context situation. It explains why the racist Edward Norton character in the movie referenced above had a positive contact relationship with an African-American in one situation (the prison laundry room) and it both generalized to the entire outgroup of all African-Americans as well as other situations.
A third generalization – referred to as the secondary transfer effect– involves whether contact with members of one outgroup will have any positive transference effects toward members of a different outgroup who were not involved in the original contact. An example of this would be a racist who has biases toward African-Americans has a positive contact experience with an African-American and generalizes that positive contact not only to African-Americans as a group, but to other groups such as Arabs. This secondary transfer, to a group not part of the original contact experience, is supported.
What explains this? Although this effect seems unlikely it’s possible to pose several explanations and Pettigrew and Tropp do so. First, and briefly, there might be an expansiveness effect that encourages a more general reappraisal of attitudes. After positive contact experiences people simply become less provincial. Secondly, prejudices are interrelated with one another. An individual who is prejudice against one group is likely to be prejudiced against others. Given these interconnections, altering attitudes in a positive direction toward one group will have similar effects toward another group.
The evidence is strong that contact generalizes in important ways. I choose to think about this issue as a matter of communication, even though actual communication is rarely, if ever, studied by social psychologists examining intergroup relations. Contact implies some sort of message exchange whether it is simple or complex, otherwise there is no contact. We will return to these issues.
The Language of Marginality
There is a rumor about that Netanyahu will conduct a major pull out of the West Bank in anticipation of the UN declaration of a Palestinian state. I first encountered the rumor in the publication Isranet which can be found here. More and more Israelis throw up their hands and say, “we can’t fight the whole world.” There is a chilling sense that the world will accept nothing less than the creation of a Palestinian state and that Israel will have to give up much to create any sort of Palestinian state. This is true. A Palestinian state is justifiably called for and an inevitability. But more than the creation of the state Israelis must move the Palestinian identity more to the center. The Palestinians have been the subject of systematic marginalization which has made it impossible for them to coalesce into a viable political entity, and much of this marginalization is associated with settlements. Let’s take a closer look at how this works.
Marginalizing another people is about the relationship between the center and the periphery and how the concept of the periphery, or margin, interacts with the center. The Palestinians live at the periphery of the environment and this informs their dualistic and contradictory identity. Thus, historically Israelis are rational and democratic and the Palestinians violent; Israelis were modern, Palestinians traditional; Israelis future looking, Palestinians backward looking. The Palestinians have been socialized at the margins. They have been told that they are politically, culturally, and economically behind or lagging or outside the mainstream. The language of marginality depends on comparisons of the center to the margins. The difference between the physician and the quack or the polite drinker and the drunk is a matter of centrality and marginality where the image of each contains qualities of the other.
And so it is between the Palestinian and the Israeli, the oriental and the occidental, the primitive and the modern. The efforts of a nation-state to achieve cohesion or a sense of a “center” are an effort to achieve unity as a nation. The current conflict between Israeli-Jews and Palestinians is defined by arguments over control of space. This intractable conflict is fraught with dangers and marginalized identities are characteristic of these intractable conflicts. Read more about intractable conflicts here.
The language of marginality relies on creating power by consigning one group to the marginal and the other to the more powerful center. The Palestinian Arab is not only marginalized through the normal power relationship but this is reflected in settlements where settlers have created a dominant unified center for themselves and work to marginalize the Palestinians.
The local Palestinians are twice alien: once within the state in which they are dominated (Israel and their settlers), and once again by the mother nation (other Palestinian Arabs).
The Palestinians clearly identify with the space they’re claiming for national political identity. According to Anthony Smith it is not necessary that a group even inhabit a space, only that they have the collective identification with the space. Essentially, the Israelis and the Palestinians are competing to construct the identity of the same space. As Smith explains with respect to the establishment of nation states, identities and cultures become politicized in order to create differences that justify claims to the land. The power to rule is based not on tribal or personal loyalties but on a fixed territorial space. Settlers who define the land as “sacred” are politicizing the land in order to create national ideologies that justify a national identity and claim to a territory. The Palestinians must do the same before they can establish a central political identity. The rhetorical battles between the Israelis and the Palestinians group around the question: who arrived first? The ideological clashes that emerge from the politicization of these discourses provide the legitimacy for acts of violence.
It is interesting how national rhetorics mirror one another. One argument used to marginalize the Palestinians is that they historically did not place great importance on the land, that is, their ideas about the land were indistinct. Only after the Israelis arrived, the story goes, did the Palestinian land identity evolve, and it took particular shape after 1948 and 1967 and the idea of a Palestinian state began to arise. Interestingly, the Israelis fashion a favorable history by accusing the Palestinians of constructing history. They go on to claim that it is the Palestinian elite who are most responsible for devising a Palestinian ethnopolitical identity and giving it intellectual justification. It was the Palestinian elite who, for example, sought to shore up the importance of Jerusalem when for Muslims Jerusalem was less important than Mecca and Medina. The Israelis, then, began to delineate whole areas of land between the Egyptian and Lebanese border, and Jordan to the East, and claimed it as “Jewish” on the grounds that the Jews were there in previous centuries and driven away but are the original inhabitants of the region. All other ethnic categories are regarded as intruders. This primordial claim to the land makes it easy to classify others as marginal. To legitimize the right to exist in all of greater Israel settlers needed to establish their descent from ancient Israel and frame the claim as culturally, scientifically, and religiously true.
Settler communication activates a pattern of thinking, a pattern that is social and marks objects such as land and geography as central or marginal thereby giving them symbolic power in society. The Palestinians have been behind in the language of centrality game, although they have made significant progress in recent years. Still, it will be interesting to watch the interplay of identities, and the competition for centrality, that emerges during a new political order that includes a recognized Palestinian political entity. But it is still true that the settlers remain at the “center” of this controversy.
The UN’s Declaration of a Palestinian State Is a Bad Idea. Here’s Why
The word is that the Palestinian Authority with the help of the UN General Assembly will unilaterally declare a Palestinian state next September. Such a declaration is not new. A statement of Palestinian independence has been endorsed by the majority of the General Assembly and received the support of many countries throughout the world. The Palestinians will do this through a United Nations legislative procedure called “uniting for peace.” Briefly, uniting for peace is a procedural rule that allows the General Assembly to maintain peace when the Security Council fails to do so. A single vote on the Security Council can prevent the passage of legislation or recommendations and this is often frustrating to the General Assembly. Hence, in the 1950s the General Assembly approved a procedure that allowed them to consider a matter when there was a threat to peace. Consequently, they can “unite for peace” and take necessary action. A brief video explanation helps explain the issue.
This procedure has been used a number of times (Korean War, 1950; Suez crisis, 1956; Afghanistan, 1980) just to name a few and has been used before with respect to Middle East issues. The circumstances of each case are of course different with some more justified than others, but the Palestinian attempt to use the procedure to declare a state is certainly a unique application. If the resolution passes the General Assembly, and it will quite easily, it will have only recommendatory powers, and would not be binding. It would not have the power to alter the legal status of the relationship between Israel and Palestine.
Then why is this a bad idea?
First, UN resolution 242 and 338 require the parties themselves to reach agreement and recognize boundaries. This is a key issue in successful negotiations. A durable and stable peace will only emerge as a result of genuine negotiations and conclusions which are authentically satisfying to each party. The basis of the entire peace process is in jeopardy by voiding resolution 242 and forcing a state declaration from the outside. Twenty years of discussions and agreements between the parties will be undermined. One might suggest that 20 years of failure is just the reason for the declaration but that would be too simplistic of a conclusion. Many of the documents, agreements, studies, and memoranda developed between the Israelis and the Palestinians are necessary for continuing negotiations.
Second, if resolutions 242 and 338 become so easy to bypass than this has consequences for future negotiations between Israel and other states in the region such as Syria and Lebanon. The Security Council will lose credibility and their resolutions will be considered voidable. Every country that has been involved in negotiations – Egypt, Jordan, the US, Russia – will be undermined. Why would any state commit time and resources when a UN resolution could render them unreliable?
Highly contested areas like Jerusalem will remain in legal and national limbo. Israel has been prevented from establishing Jerusalem, for example, as its capital. They have been thwarted at every turn in preventing embassies and diplomatic missions from locating in Jerusalem. Now, just like that, the Palestinians can declare Jerusalem as their capital? All sorts of territory, including Jerusalem, has been the subject of commitments and agreements. How is it that all of these discussions can now simply dissipate and assume that a United Nations declaration has solved the problem.
Third, how does such a resolution from the General Assembly do anything but inflame problems with respect to the status of refugees and the right of return? It is well known that resolution 242 requires a “just” solution to the refugee problem. A solution can only be just if it is accepted by the competing parties, not imposed on them. The refugee problem has implications for Jordan as well as Israel and Palestine and it seems as though they are being ignored here.
Fourth, the Oslo Accords were some of the most specific to manage temporary arrangements between Israel and Palestine. These accords call for a negotiated solution to problems relating to refugees, settlements, security, borders, and holy sites. The key term here is negotiated. The peace process is highly dependent on negotiated agreements; in other words, agreements whose outcomes are based on mutual consent and joint agreement. A General Assembly resolution, of which there are dozens of them condemning Israel, is of very limited credibility to the Israelis and will carry little weight.
Finally, it isn’t even clear what will be included in the declaration. Does the declaration of the Palestinian state include Gaza and Hamas? This is troublesome and not even acceptable to the Palestinian Authority let alone to Israel. It seems increasingly apparent that the UN move is designed to garner sympathy and increase international recognition of the Palestinian Authority.
We should keep in mind, however, that under certain conditions the declaration of a Palestinian state will be welcome. Many feel as if the Palestinians truly want to delegitimize and destroy Israel, but if they are willing to declare a state on what is about 20% of what might be considered original Palestinian territory (depending on whose maps you are using) then shouldn’t we consider this good news. The establishment and development of a Palestinian state as currently defined by its relationship with Israel in fact recognizes and legitimizes Israel. But still, many in the foreign-policy business hold firm in their demands that the parties settle their differences, not the United Nations. Palestinian leaders should think carefully about how to proceed on this matter. They have little to gain from symbolic international stunts, but much to gain from the outcome of thorough negotiations.
Am I Naïve about Communication and Political Conflict?
Typically, when I write about communication and conflict resolution, or the role of interaction and changing relationships and solving problems, especially with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I get comments from a few friends who suggest my naïveté (you know who you are Paul, David, and Joey). In other words, using communication theory and techniques to reach across the divides that separate people is by many people assumed to be too idealistic. These intractable conflicts, so the charge goes, are primordial or so defined by hate and vengeance that simply talking to the other side is a waste of time.
And sometimes I do question myself. Sometimes I think group encounters or problem-solving workshops, where conflicting parties confront one another and work out problems, are not effective and, more importantly, fail to address the issues correctly. But the research indicates otherwise. See chapter 6 of the recent book When Groups Meet: the Dynamics of Intergroup Contact. It can be purchased here. This book is a comprehensive treatment of intergroup dynamics, the sort of dynamics that characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Face-to-face communication is crucial if conflicting parties are going to overcome distorted and invalid cognitive perceptions of the other. Communicating with our conflictual counterpart is a special kind of discourse that allows the parties to examine each other’s concerns and penetrate the perspective of the other in order for solutions to emerge that are responsive to both sides.
The problem is, however, that groups in political conflict such as the Israelis and the Palestinians are characterized by tremendous power asymmetry and intractability. We typically think of power as simply the ability to control others. Yet, in conflict resolution power is a relational idea that is more than simply the control of rewards and punishments but based on influence and persuasion and consequently normal communication is impossible because of the inescapable presence of the power relationship. Hence, it makes little sense to try and work out solutions to problems when, by definition, the relationship is characterized by power asymmetry. This means that before addressing practical and material problems conflicting parties must do something about the natural power difference between them. They must engage in consciousness-raising about their power differences before confronting one another to redress differences. If they fail to do this, then resolution strategies used by each party usually simply maintain or increase favorable asymmetries and reproduce the inequalities that characterize the conflict.
An interesting theoretical question presents itself: do you work on the problems of the powerless first in an effort to approach equality, or do you try to solve practical problems on the assumption that power differences will dissipate over time. Some scholars of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict argue that issues of justice and reconciliation must come first. In other words, it is wrongheaded and immoral to start with the solutions to practical problems when the solutions will take place in a context of inequality and power asymmetry. In addition, an analysis of conflict that takes place under asymmetric condition will avoid issues of moral responsibility, truth, and justice and fail to achieve desired goals.
Attempts to resolve conflict through communication are not naïve. The conflict resolution enterprise is designed to advantage the disadvantaged and solve problems based on mutual satisfactions. Conflict resolution assumes that violence and communicative distortions must be understood if they are going to be managed. Moreover, conflict is assumed to be natural and unavoidable. Conflict is not to be avoided but to be managed.
In a recent essay by Fisher in the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict he noted that intractable conflict between identity groups with strong power asymmetry were the least amenable to intervention and resolution. However research continues to support that certain transfer effects, that is, new ideas, novel proposals, and emergent realizations were characteristic of these groups. There are any number of successful encounters between conflicting groups that forge new agreements and created mechanisms for coexistence.
Again, communication between asymmetrical groups has been shown to clarify perspectives, change perceptions, and build important trust that provided a context for successful policy decisions in negotiations. The empirical data demonstrates clearly that communication contributes to both tangible and intangible elements of the peace process. It is true that communication is not magical, it does not easily and efficiently solve all problems. In fact, communication has to be done correctly in order to be effective. Certainly, communicative contact has to be designed to maximize the likelihood of transferring a particular group experience to the larger conflict groups. And this is not easy.
I would close with the observation that if members of conflicting groups really want to solve problems, if they enter a communicative exchange with a genuine goal of solving problems then communication is not only inevitable but the only mechanism of use. Talking just to go through the motions or to use the experience as a context of manipulation designed to maximize self-interest will render few real results and contribute to the sense that communication and group engagement is a waste of time.
But just imagine for a moment that the parties to a conflict are at a hurting stalemate and genuinely decide to encounter the differences between themselves, learn more about the other group, and to focus on more general interests shared by both groups. The communicative power of this condition is significant.
So, no, I don’t think I’m naïve. In fact, if one brackets out war and violence as a problem-solving technique – and I understand the political reality of violence – then communication as I describe it is the only alternative.
How to Civilize Clashes in Clashes of Civilizations
About 20 years ago Bernard Lewis wrote an article for The Atlantic titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The article can be found here. In that article Lewis cites a number of grievances Muslims have against the United States and the West. The article was an early warning designed to explain to Westerners, who were naïve and hence shocked at the intensity of Muslim rage, what it was about Muslim culture, religion, and politics – as they came into contact with Western culture – that made them so angry.
Lewis listed a number of offenses dealing with racism, colonialism, arrogance, and the Muslim Manichaean view of the world which organizes things into the house of Islam and those who are not Muslim. The offense of the West most widely objected to was imperialism. And the term usually took on a religious significance associated with the Crusades and an attack on Islam rather than the West’s more secular political interests. Lewis goes on to make a compelling case for the seemingly confused response to imperialism. That is, the United States has never occupied Muslim land and does not have a history of military or material oppression. True, the United States is arrogant enough but, unlike the Soviet Union, we do not rule over large Muslim populations and have no history of violently quelling disturbances. Still, the US is seen as the main cultural and economic threat; it is American capitalism and democracy that is an authentic alternative and must be challenged.
The US support for Israel also figures into this negative attitude toward the West. How do we do something about this attitude? How do we begin to reach across the divide that separates the Muslim world from the West? This is of course a hideously complex question but I continue to believe that an effort towards reconciliation, conflict management, or any sort of accommodation that falls short of war and military action is necessary. One international relations theory suggests that cultures that share common institutions rarely fight one another. This is the neoconservative position responsible for the aggressive spread of democracy. If Islam would just adopt and construct democratic institutions, so the theory goes, differences between us that lead to conflict would dissolve. But what about techniques designed to maintain differences but still establish peaceful relationships. These are communication techniques.
There is one well-known communication and conflict strategy that might be helpful here. And that is to confront your differences and raise the level of abstraction such that you construct a wider circle of inclusion. Another common way of putting it is to be concerned with interests rather than issues. So, two cultures might argue over resources (an issue) or identities (an issue), but both cultures might share an “interest” in peace. Both sides share and include one another in an interest in peace. The interest in peace as a higher-order abstraction actually works very well for many potential conflicting cultures in the world. Many cultures would rather have peace than argue and fight over particular issues. It does not work well, however, for difficult, deep-rooted, intractable conflicts. So, simply going to Muslims and Westerners and telling them that “peace” is more important than their particular issues always appears naïve and usually has little or no effect.
But there are other ways to work on common interests that make for this wider circle of inclusion. The two sides have to find higher-order interest that can accommodate their differences on particular issues that separate them. Take the example of the Temple mount and the holy sites that define it. The site is sacred to both Israelis and Palestinians and the control and administration of the sites is a serious point of contention. But the two sides can come to some sort of joint acceptance and administration of the site if they define it as a holy place that does not have national implications. There are rabbis who have written that the Temple mount belongs to the world because it’s statues and symbols do not belong to one nation. The Temple mount and its holy sites are the seat of justice and divine law, not a seat of national law. Its essence is to represent humanity. Muslims, on the other hand, could make progress toward a more enlightened understanding of Judaism. There is certainly a historical tradition of Muslims excepting Jews as people of the book. This does not mean that Jews were not considered second-class citizens because of course they were not Muslim, but there have been long periods of tolerance and coexistence between Muslims and Jews. And, a religious Muslim will argue the difference between Jews, whose religious revelation they accept, and Zionism whose history and existence they reject.
We should not forget that historically Muslims and Christians had a more troublesome relationship than Muslims and Jews. Moreover, Christian fed anti-Semitism was worse than Muslim anti-Semitism. And given that Jewish-Christian relations have improved considerably through dialogue and knowledge of one another, there is no reason to think that the same cannot be true for Muslims and Jews. Another way to enlarge the circle of inclusion is to refuse to let organizations like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda define the problem. Most regimes in the Muslim world have adopted practical attitudes toward Israel and Jews, and it is even possible to find Koranic justification for a practical attitude toward Israel. The deliberative will referred to in the last post should be encouraged by the possibility of productive communication in a genuine global public sphere.
The Real Problem for the Israelis and Palestinians
I’ve been maintaining for some time that an actual solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not so difficult. I will save details for another posting, but bet I could predict what a future solution will look like. No, the problem is not the details of the solution but getting there; that is, there is a failure of will to solve the problem. There is what Andrew Smith calls in his new book a lack of a “deliberative impulse.” It is as if the parties simply do not want to solve the problem. There is no urge that compels the parties to cooperate and communicate reciprocally such that needs and desires are met. Violence does not seem to matter because both sides are numbed to violence. Let’s speculate a little about what might be helpful.
First, the two sides must develop more deliberative will. They must be more serious about actually accomplishing something. If we borrow a little from Habermas we can recognize both the informal sphere of will formation and the formal sphere. The formal sphere or context of communication is typically characterized by dispassionate styles of bargaining and negotiation. This is the communication of the elite and leaders who are trying to legitimize state actions. Many Israelis and Palestinians have opinions about formal peace processes and communication, but they feel alienated from it. They do not feel as if it is a form of communication that represents them. On the other hand, the informal sphere is the context of rough-and-tumble interaction and unregulated communication that is most influential for generating opinion.
As buses explode in Jerusalem and rockets hit Gaza the Israelis and Palestinians insist on peace processes most described by the formal sphere of communication. The representatives of the two sides of the conflict should include a wider selection of convictions and concerns. The formal sphere of conflict resolution makes people feel as if they have little chance of being heard and that they cannot succeed communicatively in such a setting.
It is not the case that the formal sphere is rational and deliberative and populated by those capable of the most reasoned argument. On the contrary, the environment that surrounds discussion about the Israeli and Palestinian conflict is rife with dogmatism, naïve idealism, xenophobia, racism, resentment, and an inability to reframe and transcend past injustices. Both societies – Israeli and Palestinian – need to deliberate more amongst themselves at ground level. The formal negotiations and the people who actually signed peace treaties and make legislation are not inclusive enough with respect to the will of the general population.
Leaders, idealists, and those in power often hold strict interpretations and understandings of issues and consider additional deliberation and discussion to be responsible for the distortion of truth. Hence, a Palestinian who believes that Israel is an illegitimate community who came into being by violence and international conspiracy will not discuss the matter of recognizing Israel’s right to exist or its political legitimacy. And an Israeli who is convinced that the Palestinians seek genocide and the elimination of the Israeli state is insensitive to discussion about recognizing Israel. A new emphasis on generating deliberative will might improve public justification and arouse members of each community toward more serious problem solving. This is all in the service of the epistemology of communication because the assembly effect that results from genuine deliberative interaction can create new understandings and perspectives. It’s important to underscore that both conservative and progressive ideas can be entrenched such that they are responsible for deliberative failure.
There are simply too many motivational roadblocks in the current conflict climate that embraces the Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians lack motivation to really solve the problem because they believe a better “deal” is possible as they drag out international sympathy. They have successfully convinced the world that they are an oppressed minority and deserving of attention, resources, and special consideration. Even their violence and defiance has been excused. The same holds for the Israelis. They are prosperous, militarily superior, reasonably democratic, and have the unwavering support of the United States. Except for the moral failing, the Israelis could continue to live as they do while considering the Palestinians a minor distraction. These situations are of course unsustainable for the long-term but they are reasons that prevent serious deliberation designed to end the conflict.
So what happens is a retreat from efforts at joint justification. The two sides give up in favor of the sort of communication that is limited to those who are like themselves and designed to reinforce already shared views. This is the sort of political polarization that is increasingly common. Netanyahu speaks only in a way that satisfies his conservative coalition, and the PA remains entrenched in their cultural and political narrative. And as Kipling pointed out, “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.”
Israelis and Palestinians Confront the Leviathan
If you will allow me to wax a little philosophical and academic, I’d like to compare the current negotiation impasse between Israelis and Palestinians to the existential question posed by Hobbes in the Leviathan. In other words, is this difficult and intractable conflict destined to end up a Hobbesian nightmare of all against all? Is Hobbes correct that human beings can just never abandon their self-interest and their will to power? Is life destined to be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, as Hobbes declares? Is it inevitable that coercive power is the only way to keep individuals in check?
If so, then negotiations and deliberations are naïve and futile. The only thing we have to look forward to is more of what happened in the settlement of Itamar last week were children were literally slaughtered. This image of children’s with their throats slit forms, for me, a collage that includes images of thousands lynching two soldiers, of the Park Hotel massacre, and rockets firing on innocent citizens from Gaza. All of this goes on against a backdrop of ethnopolitical hate that is either primal and hence untouchable, or socially constructed and potentially manageable. If this conflict is primordial and the inescapable result of ancient hatreds that cannot be placated, that cannot be reframed, that cannot be forgotten, then even Hobbes will turn his head away in shame. But this is how conflicts such as these are communicative and symbolic. They are not outside the influences of human interaction – they are not inevitable. Such conflicts are stimulated by words, meanings, and interpretations. Again, it establishes the lie in the children’s rhyme about how “sticks and stones can break your bones but names will never hurt you.”
But Dore Gold writing in Isranet explains how the accomplished diplomat Richard Holbrook began to understand that the Bosnian conflict was stoked and inflamed and deliberately stimulated; it was not an ancient hatred that was too deep to be controlled. Incitement by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who have a stake in the conflict is a bigger problem than the general public thinks. Most of the time when you read that the Palestinians are encouraging their own citizens to fight Israel it is termed “incitement.” But when the Israelis described the situation to their own population is termed “education.” This is a perfect example of the incommensurate worlds that these two conflicting populations live in. One man’s education is another man’s incitement.
It strains the imagination to try to conjure an image of what sort of beast bubbled up out of the earthly goo to kill a family in their beds and slit the throats of three children one of which was three months old. Such a horror cannot be legitimized, but it comes from somewhere, something explains it. I understand that the IDF is often cast in the same role by the Palestinians and Fayyad and Abbas have equated the Itamar murders with IDF behavior. Yet the IDF never intentionally targets innocents. But this is the definition of the conflict: extreme behavior accompanied by mirror images of one another regardless of facts or defensible arguments. Each side sees the other as violent and itself as a victim, and every behavior and action reinforces the perceptions. It’s an endless cycle that you cannot escape; it’s the definition of interactive hell.
It remains the case, however, that this conflict is not doomed to failure because it is so deep-seated. Difficult and messy as it is, it is possible for the Israelis and the Palestinians to manage, if not completely control, their problems. It is possible to escape Hobbesian logic.
One interesting approach to this, and I encourage the reader to find a book titled The Deliberative Impulse by Andrew Smith, is to not assume that people are competitive and mistrustful. Smith uses some Hobbesian assumptions to assume that people can be cooperative and drawn together or at least engage one another in a civil manner. For Hobbes people were attracted to a powerful leader so they could avoid living in fear and vulnerability. Smith suggests the same thing can lead people to cooperate and to deliberate publicly in order to solve problems. Self-interest can result in cooperation. There is certainly evolutionary theory supports such is contention.
This sounds a little contradictory but it really is not. Smith refers to it as the “deliberative impulse.” Smith takes the unusual stance – and I will take it up again in a later post – that things like conscience, morality, and commitments to community are equally motivating. Even in fractured societies and fractured conflicts such as that between the Israelis and Palestinians there is a deliberative impulse, motivation to act morally and in accordance with conscience. True, there are many barriers to deliberation which include structural barriers as well as limitations on communication, skills, and resources. But these roadblocks can be overcome by the promotion of certain types of solidarity. I will detail these in the next post.
Israel’s good-faith efforts
I would encourage anyone interested in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to read a document recently available at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The address is here: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA
Israel can drive a hard bargain and lard its negotiation stance with stubbornness and inflexibility. On more than one occasion I’ve lost patience with the Israelis and sympathized with the frustrations of the Palestinians. But all that is changed. One of Israel’s fears is that the PA is not really interested in a principled negotiation; that is, the PA continues to gain international sympathy and has so successfully defined itself as the pathetic underdog that it can ask for anything and expect to receive it.
A recent report seems to bear this out. A paper prepared by the Foreign Ministry describes the activities taken by Israel to help the Palestinians, while the Palestinians have been obstructionist and either blocked Israeli initiatives or taken steps to circumvent Oslo stipulations and those of the interim agreement. Let’s take a look at a couple of examples from the report:
1. Even though the sharp conservative Bibi Netanyahu has accepted the reality of the two state solution, his efforts to support the development of a Palestinian state have been thwarted at every turn. For example Israel has continued to work to strengthen the Palestinian economy in a wide range of fields including civil, infrastructural, political, and security. As a result, the Palestinian economy has grown 8% in 2010. There has been a reduction in unemployment and a rise in tourism.
2. Israel has addressed one of the most damning symbolic issues it faces which is the nature of roadblocks and security checkpoints. There are 28 fewer roadblocks now than there were in 2008.
3. Israel has stimulated Palestinian business efforts. They have made more entry permits available for work, expanded industrial zones, approved more bandwidth for Palestinian cellular telephone providers, and begun work on the electric project that will establish for new substations in Jenin, Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron.
We could add to this list but it seems a little fruitless in the face of Palestinian recalcitrance. The report from the Foreign Ministry points out how the Palestinians are manipulating their sympathetic position in the world political order by pursuing in the international community Palestinian claims to a future state within the 1967 borders. This is a backhanded move designed to undercut the discussions on the permanent status of the proposed two states. But there is more and some of it is particularly disturbing.
1. Palestinians continue to demand condemnation of Israel in international forums. Just when the Palestinians should be formulating a negotiated relationship with Israel, one that will leave both of them strong and viable after a final agreement, the Palestinians are trying to diminish Israel’s legitimacy–a stance that will not serve Palestine well in the future.
2. It also appears as if the Palestinians are calling on known biased organizations toward Israel, such as the Human Rights Council in Geneva, to condemn Israel for war crimes. This again is nothing but provocative and counterproductive. It is a misrepresentation of the facts designed for symbolic damage to Israel and an effort to diminish Israel’s right to self-defense. There are numerous clauses in the temporary agreements that govern the relationship between Israel and Palestine that stipulates that the sides should not incite one another and spread propaganda and misrepresentations. This, of course, is sensible and productive negotiation behavior but is being undermined and manipulated by the Palestinians.
3. And the extent to which the PA continues to glorify terrorists and openly commemorate their extremist behaviors, remains a major impediment to peace. The report indicated that the Palestinian presidential compound in Ramallah has been renamed to glorify the terrorist Yihye Ayash.
These are but a few examples of Israel’s progressive efforts and the PAs regressive ones. Again I do not hold Israel blameless on these matters and many of these actions have complex interpretations. But mature negotiation relies on the establishment of common meaning; a collective sense of what you are bargaining about. In fact, bargaining is not even the right word. Bargaining is strategic action in which each side tries to maximize its gains. That’s what’s going on now, and it leads to exaggerated requests and expectations such as a Palestinian expectation that Israel has no right to exist.
But true deliberative discourse, where both sides are genuinely reflecting upon their preferences and views, is an epistemic process where new ideas can emerge based on the genuine interest of both parties to solve the conflict. I will have more to say about the benefits of deliberative discourse in another post.
The Education of the Tweet and Blog Classes
I was struck by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt by the juxtaposition of explanations for these revolutions. We heard of one set of very modern explanations that included Facebook, tweets, cell phones, and the Internet. This also included the more traditional reporting of CNN and the yet unexplored influences of new news outlets such as Al Jazeera. Even if we do not get all excited about how new media are bringing about a utopian consciousness it is surely the case that social media played an important role. It was the tweet and blog class then, young educated hipsters, which brought about revolution. This is the modern communication technology explanation. Facebook facilitates new public spheres and the resultant communication constructs new revolutionary realities.
But it’s also possible to point to Mohammed Bouazizi’s self immolation as a protest over the seizing of his produce and his disrespectful treatment as the action that provoked the opening moments of the demonstrations in Tunisia. Self immolation is so horrifying to the West, and so removed from our consciousness, that it provokes deep identification with the conditions that produce it. The depth and intensity of the protest must be so great that it has prompted this horrific act. This is the primal explanation; this is the explanation that blames the depths of human depravity for revolutionary conditions, not modern technology.
The tweet and Facebook classes are steeped in more abstract principles of democracy and human rights, the sort of thinking that comes from formal learning and classroom experiences. These are the ideas handed down from the intellects of previous generation. The primal explanation bubbles up from our reptilian brain and expresses itself in the raw violence of something like immolation.
Most of us are influenced by the Tweet and Facebook class because that is how we live today. We feel as though the tweeters and Facebookers are on the right side of history, that they are the future. So in believing that tweets and Facebook are responsible for noble revolutions, we are believing in our own world. We are attracted to, and likely to overestimate, the power of social media because it confirms our own consciousness.
It is the primal explanation that fits the rape of the CBS correspondent Lara Logan. This is a part of protest and revolution that we do not want to think about. But when we do think about it we feel as though the veil of democratic civility has been lifted and feel once again the hate and violence that is part of such revolutions. The tweet and blog class is cultivated and articulate but behind them is a mob with distorted beliefs and an inability to make distinctions that would separate an earnest journalist from hated political figures.
And Al Jazeera is finally having the revolutionary effects we all thought possible. Al Jazeera has been broadcasting for 15 years and its images are having powerful effects. Al Jazeera certainly has a perspective but it is not propaganda. They showed images of angry people and bloodied bodies and these were in sharp contrast to the spurious statements of regime leaders. While Egypt’s controlled media showed pleasant images of traffic going by Al Jazeera was showing protests and calls for freedom. It was a classic example of the power of the press to bring information and perspective to citizens.
As reported by Al Jazeera, Egypt broke its contract and cut Al Jazeera’s access to the satellite thus denying the Al Jazeera audience access to what was going on in Egypt. But fortunately, other Arabic language TV stations picked up the Al Jazeera signal and the images continued to be available. The genie of free press and information rights has fled the bottle of Arab dictatorships. It is simply impossible now, or at least much more difficult, to control the images and information that the public deserves to see. The tweet Facebook class is gaining the upper hand.
Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood
I’m a pretty strong democracy advocate. I have little doubt in my soul and in whatever intellectual weight I can bring to the problem, that democratic processes are superior to others. I accept that Francis Fukayama was correct, in his book The End of History, that the natural evolution of all political states is toward democracy and market economies. Democracy contains its own moral legitimacy by requiring that the governed sanction governance. This does not ensure quality or competent government, for the governed can surely be inept, but it does guarantee civil legitimacy.
Still, one cannot be naïve about these things because democracy requires advanced citizenship and a democratic” state of mind” as well as democratic processes. By” state of mind” I mean the attitudes and values of democracy must be internalized by the populace. The populace must understand and accept the inherent values of equality and due process that underscore democratic theory. We can easily cite the cases (Hamas) where democracy was reduced to elections and those elections produced undemocratic governments. The United States is often described as” exceptional” partly because its democracy evolved slowly and accumulated laws and traditions that were honed in a justice system shaped itself from democratic principles.
This is what worries me about the incipient Egyptian democracy. The Muslim brotherhood as a political party will have, and deserves in accordance with democratic principles, a legitimate voice. But the brotherhood contains its own rejections of democracy. I’m reminded of the argument made by Amy Chua in World on Fire that showed how free markets and democratic processes unleashed ethnic demagoguery and more destruction than construction. She, of course, was talking about the particular case of market-dominant minorities; that is ethnic minorities who for a variety of reasons had concentrated wealth. This wealth by minorities caused tremendous ethnonationalism and frustrated indigenous majorities. Her analysis, which is not my chief concern here, demonstrates how democracy and market economies can backfire and cause anger, humiliation, and violence.
I fear something similar in Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood has been outlawed and controlled in Egypt by an authoritarian system. But they played an important role in the revolution and will expect to be rewarded. It’s possible that Egypt will open up the door to theocracy and a return to a form of Middle Eastern dark ages.
The Brotherhood is the forerunner of Hamas and Hezbollah and responsible for the assassination of Sadat in 1981. It is possible to imagine them as a monstrous organization steeped in a distorted tribal mentality that has fire in its breath and blood on its hands. Many people, including myself, yearn for an orderly transition with democratic outcomes. We had dreams in the early days of the protest that some Mandela would step forward, take the nation by the hand and lead it into the future. But it’s more likely that we have handed over Egypt to the Muslim Brotherhood. The brotherhood has remained coy. They have kept quiet and shunned the violence. They are not stupid, they know that such rhetoric would be very counterproductive at this point in time.
Does anyone really think that a government that includes the Brotherhood will maintain its peace agreement with Israel? ElBaradei has already made statements that placed the peace agreement in jeopardy. In some ways Egypt is moving from a political system in which it would be easier to transition to democracy than one which contains serious Islamic ideology. Ideological systems like socialism or Islam are very ingrained and do not change easily. Regimes governed by raw authoritarianism oppress their people and plant the seeds of revolution. These uprisings often lead to democratic changes or calls for more freedom and political rights. This is not so in ideological regimes.
Hard as it is to imagine, the Shah of Iran was a paragon of enlightenment compared to the mullahs governing Iran. The Muslim brotherhood is the most organized political force in Egypt: it represents the genuine religious interests of much of the population and, like it or not, simply cannot be ignored. It is the organizational and ideological wellspring of the global Islamist movement. And although Egypt is different from Iran, and will not become a thoroughly theocratic state, the Muslim brotherhood will be empowered. There are reasons to be afraid, very afraid.
Peace and Conflict Politics 