Category Archives: Political Conflict
Obama’s Last Term and the Middle East: What’s Next?
It is common political wisdom that things change when a president is elected to a second term because he is no longer constrained by the need to be reelected. He can govern in a more freewheeling manner consistent with his most deeply held convictions and the next election be damned. This is a slight simplification since presidents have other obligations and limits on their behavior, but it remains true that a second term in office makes it more possible to legislate for one’s legacy. So how will Obama’s second term in office change his approach to the Middle East and Israel in particular? I think there are three changes we might see during Obama’s second term.
First, Obama and Netanyahu need to start over or at least recalibrate their relationship. During his first term Obama was not particularly energized by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of course, he would like to be remembered as the president that achieved the elusive goal of peace but probably realizes that this is unlikely. Still, Obama will not forget that Israel is a true friend and he will continue to support it through good times and bad. Obama and Netanyahu will move closer together and work to achieve common goals and manage common threats. Obama mentioned Israel many times during the campaign and this was more than simple campaign rhetoric. It represented the importance of the Israel-US relationship.
Israel and the US have a long and strong relationship that has changed somewhat but remains a strategic advantage to both. Israel assists the US with security threats and increasingly influences US military research and development. The two countries not only cooperate economically but have strong cultural resonances. Despite the fact that the US jeopardizes its relationships with the Arab world because of its close relationship with Israel, the US continues to balance these relationships. For example the US still relies on stable but nondemocratic countries such as Saudi Arabia to influence interests in the area. This represents US pragmatism as well as fundamental foreign policy convictions. All of this is consistent with Netanyahu’s primary concern for Israel’s safety and security. The relationship between the US and Israel as well as the importance of cooperation (on issues such as a nuclear Iran, terrorist intelligence, foreign aid, and military readiness) will be the foundation for a renewed relationship between Obama and Netanyahu.
Secondly, Obama has other issues in the Middle East he must attend to. Syria is coming apart, a nuclear Iran is coming together, and the politicization of Islam is on the rise. Netanyahu and Israel will certainly be helpful with these matters but, ironically, Israel must be kept at bay otherwise their presence will inflame the situation. But there are limits to what Obama can do to resolve these conflicts. In the cases of Syria and Iran Obama must diplomatically pull strings from the background and this is always slower and more difficult. But one thing is for sure: Obama will be better in managing this than Romney. Obama is more interested in helping Israel with less violence and more compromise and this is important. This is a different perspective than the one from those who supported Romney for president because they thought Obama lacked a clear commitment to Israel.
Obama represents a more diplomatic and a slower foreign-policy hand than either Romney or Bush before him. A second term will ensure that he will be better able to express this agenda. I think Obama will spend more time working with moderate regional states to achieve interests on their own rather than waiting for the United States. For example, the US does not have a taste for supplying Syrian rebels with weapons; thus, Obama will work to triangulate interests of others to form blocks and coalitions that might be better able to achieve goals. Again, this is slower and more frustrating – and leads those with more macho foreign-policy tendencies to be critical – but is closer to an approach that will be successful. International alliances based on common interests of preventing terrorism and stopping those who would intimidate their own citizens are most able to build successes.
A third trend for Obama’s second term should be increased attention to human rights, especially with respect to foreign policy. Obama was actually not very vulnerable to attack from the right during the campaign with respect to strength in foreign policy. His killing of Osama bin Laden, the “surge” of troops in Afghanistan, and his rather casual acceptance of questionable security practices (under the guise of security and strength) have been roundly criticized. Obama has been lax with respect to the promise to close Guantanamo, warrantless wiretapping, and drone attacks. I am convinced that he continued these policies for fear of appearing to be a weak liberal and now that he has no more elections to condition his behavior, Obama will turn his attention to the recognition of human rights. Drone attacks have essentially replaced the interrogation room and courtroom. They deliver a death sentence without confronting the knotty legal questions about interrogation or innocence.
The campaign is over but not the resonances in the deserts of the Middle East. After the world is finished congratulating him on his election victory, they will look to the United States for assistance and guidance. Obama will be more puppetmaster than puppet.
The Two State Solution and the Next Four Years
The cynics among us will believe that nothing much will change in the next four years in the Middle East but that is a particularly narrow view. There have been important changes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict along with the relationship between the US and Israel. The Bush administration was aggressive in their efforts to reshape the region and trapped in a narrow ideological position that always seemed to favor the military. Obama’s first four years were characterized mostly by patience and changes in certain political conditions such as the Palestinian economy, settlement construction, and security. But Obama did not foreground the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; he did not stake his presidency on it or claim that he had new ideas or directions.
The problem now, and Obama’s most prominent obstacle should he be reelected, is resuscitating the peace process and getting back to discussions about the political viability of the Palestinians. Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition with the right wing parties is necessary for him to govern but brings about a mix of partners that is thoroughly incapable of making the necessary adjustments that will improve the situation. The tensions between Hamas and Fatah continue and keep the conflict inflamed such that Hamas can interfere with any progress on the part of Fatah. But if Obama gets another four years he might be able to play a more significant role in a two state solution because the main parties – the Israelis and Palestinians – are incapable of reaching an accord on their own.
Things have been quiet of late. There have been few efforts toward settlement and many believe it’s a calm before the storm. Of course the Israeli leadership has been waiting until after the elections (which will be just a few days from now) to see who they will be doing business with. But whomever is elected president must engage in a workable two state solution that addresses the history and aspirations of both sides. Romney, at present anyway, is thoroughly incapable of doing this. A significant campaign plank for Obama has been that a vote for Romney is a vote to return to a way of doing things more characteristic of the Bush administration. This will be equally true in foreign policy as in economic policy. And although Romney is probably more moderate than the campaign represents, I have still seen nothing in his policy or speeches to indicate the sympathy or nuance necessary for genuine settlement of this dispute. At present, the task of solving the conflict is made more complicated by a loss of confidence in the two state solution. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become even more dangerous and unsolvable because the most viable and politically legitimate option (the two state solution) is losing credibility.
In the earlier days of the conflict the Palestinians expressed little interest in the two state solution because they saw it as artificial and, more importantly, were clearly not inclined to offering the Israelis a parallel right to a state. Later they came to accept a two state solution but not with full enthusiasm. But a second Obama administration will be in a much better position to inaugurate a state even though conditions are more difficult. Interestingly, there is more enthusiasm for building a Palestinian state among global leaders and Europeans than from the Palestinians themselves. A Palestinian state in the future will provide one barrier against extremism and help with forging coalitions with Iran and other Islamists.
The next president will have to approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with skill and sensitivity. There’s a danger that a two state solution is an American solution or, even worse, an Israeli one rather than a mulilateral solution. Many Palestinians feel that the idea of statehood has been distorted and that anything they agree upon would be something other than their own.
There is a real chance that statehood could dissolve into the background as a Palestinian achievement. There’s so much cynicism and lack of confidence in the process that both sides see statehood is an impossible achievement. But Obama is actually in a better position than any previous president to resuscitate the two state solution because of his ability to speak to diverse audiences and thereby improve America’s standing. If Obama actually became engaged in the Middle East peace process and deployed all of his powers of diplomacy he just might succeed.
The world is growing weary of the endless repetition of issues such as security, refugees, Jerusalem, and borders. The entire peace process is filled with slogans and clichés about peace that does not get anyone any closer to goals. Obama is in a position to find a new language to reconnect both sides to their national aspirations and do it in such a way that all sides are strengthened. All of this of course is assuming he is reelected.
“Political Friendship” A New Kind of Weak Tie Deliberative Relationship
Solving ethnopolitical conflicts involves initiating the two conflicting groups into the larger cultural conversation, where the understanding is that the conversation is about the relationship between the two groups. This involves creating a relationship where members of each group understand that they must engage in reasonable discourse, accept the burdens of justification, and reject illiberal attitudes and behaviors. Another way to think about it is as a network of weak ties. Weak ties are important forms of relationships that are more casual friendships or work relationships (e.g., acquaintance or coworkers) and engage in less intimate exchanges and share fewer types of information and support than those who report stronger relationships. Strong ties include in their exchanges a higher level of intimacy, more self disclosure, emotional as well as instrumental exchanges, reciprocity in exchanges, and more frequent interaction. We have fewer strong ties and they are more important to our personal lives. Facebook and electronic contacts create numerous weak ties that serve important functions.
What Danielle Allen (2004), in her book “Talking to Strangers”, describes as “political friendship” is a sort of important weak tie. This is the sort of friendship that goes beyond the close relationships we have with family members and intimates. Political friendship is a set of practices and habits used to solve problems and bridge difficult differences. Emotional attachment to the other is less important than the realization of interdependence and the need for practical problem resolution. This form of a communicative relationship serves as a useful outlet for conflict resolution, and allows minority groups in multicultural societies to establish mature relationships with the dominant group. The polarization described by Sunstein that currently characterizes the American political environment is a consequence of the degeneration of political friendships. Allen’s political friendships treat opponents as respectful adversaries that have common interests in problem resolution as much as anything else. The issue sophistication that comes with political friendship is quite compatible with the ability to sustain “reasonable disagreement.”
The concept of political friendship is important and deserving of some elaboration. It is necessary to develop a healthy path to the resolution and reconciliation of group conflicts in order to provide either citizens or members of competing groups with political and interpersonal agency. The idea of political friendship is particularly associated with citizenship which is not necessarily a matter of civic duties but a communicative role that values negotiation and reciprocity. It is an excellent relationship to cultivate between members of different cultural and political groups because it is based more on trust than self-interest. Political friendship recognizes self-interest but develops a relationship that rests on equitable self-interest; that is, a relationship where each attends to the utilitarian needs of the other. As Allen (2004) writes, “Equity entails, above all else and as in friendship a habit of attention by which citizens are attuned to the balances and imbalances in what citizens are giving up for each other.” (p. 134). Political friendship is less concerned with intimacy because intimacy is reserved for relatively few relationships that are more absorbing and based on sacrifice and strong identity with the other. But utilitarian political relationships can apply to large numbers of people and is focused on the pragmatics of problem solving or resource gratification. Parent-child, ruler and ruled, or superior- subordinate relationships are not political relationships because they limit the autonomy and agency of one person (the child, ruled, or subordinate) and are based on maximization of differences. In short, the political friendship relationship is central to the problems associated with multicultural contact and the ability of groups to develop their capacities for trust and communication. As Allen (2004) points out, we have to teach people how to “talk to strangers.”
It is necessary to identify some conditions of political friendship. These are habits of communication that facilitate the relationship. They include recognizing and publicly acknowledging groups and their differences as well as promoting deliberative environments and intelligent judgment. Many of these communication behaviors require exceptional sensitivity and tolerance. Recognizing a group, for example, that is less talkative or more remote from Western habits of thinking and either accepting the differences or trying to meld cultural norms is difficult. So minority groups simply need to learn communication skills most associated with success depending on the nature of the dominant culture. Diverse groups must understand their problems as “public” problems. Under the best conditions different groups will have secure knowledge of each other and a similar level of understanding about what is occurring between them.
New Media and Political Conflict
Claims that new media such as Facebook, Twitter, and the Internet have significant impacts on political activity and protest continue to swirl around in the academic world in particular. It takes little more than a local citizen to be interviewed and report his use of Facebook for the world believe that these fancy new media are responsible for protest and the outbreak of Jeffersonian democracy. Consequently, there is contentious debate about the role of social media in crystallizing events in certain countries. The long-term research on these matters is sparse but we can introduce a scholarly perspective and at least “sum up” our current state of knowledge. There is a review article pertaining to the Internet and politics here. Below I will intertwine some commentary with a statement of the general direction of this research.
It is true that social media play a role in political protest and organization. But it is important not to overstate the role. The riots and eventual overthrow of Mubarak were influenced by social media but not caused by them. This is especially true as a protest spreads because it becomes more difficult to contain information. If the social upheaval gains traction, if it refuses to fade away and the size of the crowds swell, then many participants will begin documenting and sharing images. This becomes a self reinforcing cycle as it becomes apparent that more people are participating and thus encouraging others to participate.
The opportunity for what is termed “user generated content” is a special feature of new media. This means that information and stories about political activity are removed from the sole hands of the official journalist community. Bloggers and users of Facebook and Twitter begin to produce content, write stories, and take pictures and essentially become citizen journalists. A so-called “citizen journalist” will have a different perspective than the professional journalist. He or she will have a more subjective and “on the ground” view with a more hard hitting human impact. That is one reason why social media are better at coordinating leaderless challenges to authority than they are at organizing democratic processes. Dramatic photographs that come to characterize a political movement (burning flags, violent police or security people, dead innocents) are increasingly likely to be taken by citizens with new media capabilities. The amount and quality of user generated content is also dependent on the richness of the media system of the country. Egypt, for example, had greater use of Twitter with more tweets from organizations and activists then did Tunisia. It is not surprising that Egypt and Tunisia, which have more new media users than any country in the region, experienced greater social upheaval and pressure toward change. An interesting future research question will be to explain why some countries have experienced unsuccessful protests (Algeria, Bahrain) or no protest at all (Saudi Arabia) even though these are cultures with access to new media.
New media lowers the cost of collective action. It makes organization cheaper and available to more people. A key challenge in all social organization is to take networks of people with weak ties and coordinate and motivate them. The quick, inexpensive, and pervasive contacts available through Twitter or Facebook make this easier. But the downside is that the ease of contact and organization made possible by new media makes it more difficult to build permanent and durable social structures. This is related to the term “slacktavist” or the tendency for new media to be an easy way to contribute, a way that does not require much effort, but make people feel like they are doing more than they actually are.
This tendency to make dramatic claims for the effects of new media continues: Jay Carney, a spokesman for the White House, claimed that the video offensive to Islam caused the riots in Libya. We know now of course that the video had no such potency. Still, because the Internet is not confined by physical boundaries it provides political actors with a number of opportunities. It becomes easier to destabilize social systems from afar. There are now electronic diasporas that enable ethnic or religious communities to stay in touch with their home countries and maintain identities rather than assimilate into a host country. Muslim communities that ring the city of Paris are one example. Lack of cohesion, difficulty with language and employment, and regular cultural tensions are consequences of failing to assimilate and maintaining an identity within ethnic homeland. It is also important not to forget that the Internet is more vulnerable to censorship than you might think. There is an association between Internet use and democratic processes in a country, but this is probably more likely the result of democracies allowing widespread Internet use.
In the future it will be impossible to study social protest or conflicts without including the Internet and the tools that it makes available. New technologies are increasingly integrated into our political consciousness and more than anything else are influencing the information process. In other words, it will affect what news becomes available to different cultures, how fast it reaches various subgroups, and as exemplified by Wikileaks it will make new information available. In the end, social movements are increasingly dependent on new media but it remains the case that such movements have ethnopolitical explanations and that politics and history come first.
Your Muslim Neighbor
There are about 1 billion Muslims and they are probably here to stay. Historically, Muslims cared little about others and kept to themselves. Christians and Jews were strange sects that were deserving of a certain amount of condescending respect as people of the book and part of the Abrahamic religious tradition, but were assumed to be misguided and lost. Even as transportation and new technology made the world smaller, and Islam fell behind on measures of progress, Muslims stayed within the confines of their religion and allowed themselves to become subjects of European rulers.
Muslims are now our neighbors both locally and globally and, like it or not, we are required to live with them. But the relationship is not very neighborly. Our Muslim neighbors have formed a block party in which they regularly claim they are disrespected. The easiest way to do this is to assert that Mohammed and their holy book have been insulted. That’s why the silly and amateurish film “The Innocence of Muslims” was so easily effective. Neighborhood watch leaders have to do little more than claim disrespect in order to stoke the fires that burn in their followers. We Western neighbors are particular targets and have always been the subject of Muslim criticism. The defining leaders of modern Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood such as al-Banna and Qutb saw America as the palatial neighborhood whorehouse that was libidinous and unkempt.
Our new global neighbors have obliterated boundaries so there are unclear distinctions between groups and each believes in its own foundational truths. We in the western portion of the neighborhood have “free speech” and “democratic rights” and our Muslim friends hold dear to the belief that Allah is the God of everyone. Therefore both neighborhood groups feel authorized and permitted to force their values on the other. The distasteful Internet video was insensitive but still protected by freedom of expression according to the Western neighbors; on the other hand, our Muslim friends in the East hold the same foundational belief about insulting Islam – it’s not protected symbolic expression. The clash of these “universal” values is powerful and the streets are aflame in riots and protests.
Egyptians have a difficult future ahead of them as more extreme fundamentalists fight pragmatic politicians. Difficult as it may be to understand, and as conservative as the Muslim Brotherhood might be, they are no match for the Salafists and their desire to purge Islam and Muslim lands of all Western influences. The Salafist leaders, if they get their way, will destroy tourism because they do not want to see people in bathing suits; they will stunt the growth of business and the economy by refusing to conduct transactions with certain cultures; half of the population (women) will be denied basic human rights and prevented from contributing productively to the economy.
During the Egyptian “revolution” when Mubarak was removed there was a glimmer of hope that the key political and intellectual battle would be between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s secular nationalists and developing liberals. But it looks like the closer relationship (Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist) will contend for the soul of Egypt. And as events play out in the news the same might be true of Libya and Syria. So the neighborhood is reorganizing itself such that more difficult groups will be contending for leadership. This does not bode well for future problems with respect to weapons accumulation. It’s likely that proud and conservative governments, with traditions of demands for dignity and respect, like the one emerging in Egypt may want to follow in the footsteps of Iran and amass weapons thereby consolidating their demands for respect but making the neighborhood an even more dangerous place to live.
Trouble with my neighbor can be handled in one of two ways – arm and isolate my household to protect myself, or carry over fresh baked goods and chat. Neither alternative will do all by itself but we should stand firm on our demands that our neighbors learn from us and trust us. And, of course, we have to engage them. Yes, protected symbolic expression is important and one does not behave violently or riotously just because they were insulted. But it’s also true that “holding one’s tongue” and cultural adaptability remain part of the democratic governance we want to encourage.
The Communicative Construction of Identity
The below is an excerpt from my book “Deliberative Communication and Ethnopolitical Conflict.”
The preference for one’s own kin is powerful. But identities are not fixed at birth. They are subject to developmental and social influences. They are not flimsy and change at will, but they are constructed out of the surrounding interactional environment. As Suny (2001) argues, identities are fashioned by the stories groups tell about their history, nature, homeland, and common descent. People change identities over time because such identities depend on networks of associations and proximity to others. An Israeli-Jew who lives in Israel will identify as “Israeli” but his son or daughter who moves to the U.S. will identify more as an American. The over arching “American” identity is very important here because it serves as a common identity category that helps perpetuate a commitment to a more general civic allegiance. Deep ethno-national divisions are most associated with violence and those situations where ethnic groups believe the state should cease to exist. The role of the deliberative experience in giving group members new communicative opportunities is most important for developing an over arching identity that can render each side more receptive to argumentative claims.
The actual nature and content of ethnic identity is a symbolic construction process done for instrumental reasons from instrumental resources. The conceptual difficulty with ethnic identity is that rigorous objective definitions of ethnic groups do not allow for variability and change or the importance of developmental processes and identity. Subjective definitions make it difficult to understand the nature and evolution of individual ethnic identity. Moreover, even if ethnic identity is not objective, and it is subject to social influences and manipulation, it remains an essential construct that is not only experienced as very real to people, but is strongly implicated in much human behavior. Instrumentalism is the idea that choosing an identity group is a practical decision that has potential beneficial outcomes. There is more human choice in instrumental notions of ethnic identity. Instrumentalism is how identity is formed. It is also the means by which identity is exercised. I will accept Brass’ (1996) description of instrumentalism as beginning with objective markers (race, religion, dress, food, dialect) but these are interpreted and subjected to change.
Instrumentalism recognizes a strong flexibility and developmental influence on identity formation. Yet, after an identity has been set it is very difficult to change. It is how people see themselves that matter. They may identify around a type of clothing at one time but something else later. This ensures that the group identity remains stable and only the token that refers to the group type changes. One is bound to his ethnic identity on the basis of personal relations, practical necessity, and common interests. Elites use these relationships to solidify identity groups for their own political interests. Slobodan Milosevic employed the rhetoric of victimization to characterize Serbs as in need of liberation through destruction. This was a clear instrumental use of political conditions to construct an interpretation of national identity.
Israeli identity is particularly interesting because it can serve as sort of laboratory for how social, political, and cultural resources are marshaled in the service of identity construction. And it is a good example of the instrumental construction of identity. Israel is a new state that differs from others in that it had no preexisting nationhood. The early Israeli immigrants shared no common culture, and new immigrants after the establishment of the state came from diasporic communities in many parts of the world. Still, Israel benefited from the common sense of Jewish nationhood. Even though this was not a geographically bounded national territory, and Jews lived as minorities with different languages, cultures, and appearance, they believed in a common ethnic descent. This included a common religious heritage, language, and affection for a territorial area (ancient land of Israel). As Smooha explains, these were the common bonds and ideological foundations of the state of Israel but the task of the Zionists was to organize these instrumental resources into an identity. Thus, Jews that began to settle in Israel were not called immigrants but “returnees” connoting their temporary absence from the homeland and their return to it with full rights. Various symbols of the state (e.g. Star of David, blue stripes, menorah) are taken from religious and biblical history, which is shared by Jews and easily identifiable by everyone.
Jewish ethnic identity in Israel has been strongly encouraged by assimilationist policies (Smooha, 2004). In order to seek a stronger base of unity the identification of ethnic differences was discouraged. Even though there were obvious differences (physiological and cultural) between Jews from Arab countries and Eastern Europe, these differences were less important than common Jewish ethnic heritage. All Jews are granted automatic and full citizenship. Jews from Arab countries do not go to culturally separate schools or are encouraged to foster a distinct Jewish identity (Smooha, 2004). There is certainly individual prejudice and economic and inequities, but these are outside official state efforts to fashion a cohesive Jewish ethnic identity. And, of course, nothing solidifies an ethnic identity like existential threat. The relentless Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the conflict ethos that permeates the culture, cultivates unity among Jews. Ethnic identity in Israel is produced and reproduced by politics, social class, and the ethnic separation that has characterized the Mizrahim and the Ashkenazi since the early days of the state. For the case of Israel, Smooha (2004) describes the persistence of ethnic identity and the major fault lines that divide ethnic groups (class, economics, cultural hegemony, conflict).
Identities develop communicatively in the context of relationships but the Israelis and Palestinians are in the unique position of developing group identities under conditions of conflict. When this happens, the open flow of information stops and individuals feel threatened. They feel destabilized and a strong sense of self preservation ensues. The impulse to respond in a violent manner is activated as an act of self preservation. This causes members of respective groups to “protect” themselves and “defeat” the other. The entire flow of information in the environment becomes distorted such that the normal refinement of ideas about ourselves that produces growth and development closes down. Group polarization becomes apparent and our negative images of the other become frozen in time. The development of our ethnic or group identity no longer incorporates new images of the enemy group, especially as contact with the other group diminishes or becomes informally restrictive. Under normal conditions processing new information that leads to identity change and development is self-protective and allows us to function and manage the world. But frozen identities under conditions of conflict close down the learning process as a new form of survival.
Identities become rigid as beliefs solidify and each group considers its view of events as most accurate. Attitudes about responsibility and blame take on great certainty. In Maoz and Ellis (2001) we found that Israelis and Palestinians argued from positions of certainty and because each side is relatively closed off from the other, their conclusions about resolving the conflict were formed in informational isolation. This resulted in conclusions that were unrealizable and based on zero-sum thinking because each side dismissed the other’s assessment. Identities fashioned in conflict are particularly characterized by the “blame game.” Since it is unlikely that one looks inward for blame, failures and responsibility are cast on the evil other. This protects a positive self image and maintains the group’s integrity.
Ethnicity is highly implicated in many political conflicts and involved in an identity development that is conflictual as well as ethnic. In other words, during the developmental process is when an ethnic conflict ethos can also become part of an adolescent’s fundamental ethnic identity. They develop not only recognition of membership in a descent group, but an oppositional relationship with an out-group is part of that definition. Strongly ideologically based Israeli-Jews and West Bank and Gaza Arabs, for example, have grown up in a societal milieu where the attachment process to their ethnic group includes an ethos of conflict. This culture of conflict supplies a steady stream of messages about what it means to be a member of an ethnopolitical group. The significant events in the developmental life of young people include religious, political, and cultural rites of passage that fuel ethnic distinctiveness. These are the conditions of intractability when identities are developed and defined in opposition to others. The identity is not one of simply a single implication of ethnic membership formulated normally with a customary amount of pride. Rather, it is a conflictual identity with double implications—the group membership is functional and allows for management in a difficult society, but then continues the conflict.
In work over the years with Israelis and Palestinians (cf. Ellis, 2006; Maoz & Ellis, 2006) it is possible to see the communicative and relational consequences of these conflict based identities. The protection of ethnopolitical group identity plays an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both sides feel threatened and the Israeli state stimulates a sense of humiliation for the Palestinians. And although the two state solution and the creation of a Palestinian state is now accepted by most Israelis, such a state continues to be threatening. There remains a zero-sum mentality that makes a solution that satisfies both sides still illusive. Both sides cling to ideas about what is “right” and have trouble finessing their positions because of their failure to continually process new information. Both sides have a long history of trauma and humiliation. The creation of the State of Israel was painful for the Palestinians and they feel historically marginalized and discriminated against, which has led to cycles of violence and revenge fantasies. The Jews, on the other hand, carry historical victimization and discrimination culminating in the holocaust. Hence, both sides have mirror victimization identities and are locked in a no win argument about who is more deserving. This sort of identity pain can last for decades or even centuries.
Romney’s Foreign-Policy Chops
Here’s what Mitt Romney said the other day while speaking in Jerusalem:
“We have a solemn duty and a moral imperative to deny Iran’s leaders the means to follow through on their malevolent intentions. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that containment is an option.”
According to most analyses Romney took a rather aggressive stand supporting preemptive strikes and doing more than the diplomatic dance of the United States. Romney’s performance in Israel is a pretty good test of his foreign-policy chops and his diplomatic skills. He didn’t fail the test but his grade is fairly low. He embarrassed the English during their Olympic moment on the world stage, his characterization of the Palestinians as being culturally behind, and that’s why their gross national product is not as high as Israel’s, is pretty naïve and may even contain a tinge of racism. But he was not completely wrong about Iran and difficulties we face.
The Republic of Iran wants to be a nuclear power. They want a seat at the table with the grown-ups who have the biggest weapon and the most threat. The question of whether or not they deserve a seat at the table remains to be seen. I think you have to prove yourself. Just like you do not get to handle that big machine we call an automobile until you pass the test, you don’t get the responsibility of having nuclear weapons until you demonstrate you can handle the responsibility. Declaring that Allah is guiding your missiles and that some cultures need annihilation does not exactly represent the sort of maturity the world is looking for. But Iran does not seem to care much because they are defying international pressure and seemed to be unconcerned with any diplomatic efforts.
Iran turning its nose up at UN Security Council resolutions directing them to suspend enrichment, and refusing to explain fully their nuclear intentions do not add up to an acceptable definition of “maturity.” It is simply dangerous for Iran to enter the inner sanctum of the nuclear club: there are plenty of reasons for this danger not the least of which is the addition of more nuclear weapons capable of detonation, but the extent to which it would embolden the Iranians is one of the most dangerous. They already support terror in various places in the world and membership in the nuclear club would probably just encourage them to continue their terrorist ways against the United States and Israel. Even if there were some semblance of checks on their nuclear arsenal this sort of provocative activity could spur a conventional war. There is no doubt that tensions in the Middle East would escalate. Israel has a nervous finger on the trigger of nuclear weapons and the foreign-policy rooted in existential threat. Israel responds sharply to existential threat and the nuclear Iran would certainly qualify.
The geopolitical balance of power would be altered and the pickings would be ripe for additional nuclear proliferation. Allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would undermine efforts to control weapons and how they are used. It would also be a defeat for the United States who has led the efforts to stop Iran and essentially organized the boycott. If the United States is perceived as failing to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons than the question of US power and influence will be unanswered.
There remains diplomacy to play out. Simply attacking Iran would be very provocative and causes many problems as it might solve. Some diplomatic process is the only alternative at this point. But the hell of it is that nothing much can be done during the political campaign because there are significant differences between the Democrats and the Republicans on this matter. The argument that Obama is weak on Iran does not hold much water. Obama is not weak on Iran, he is smart on Iran. It is simply reckless and dangerous to sound like a gunslinger on this issue. Obama is capable of convincing people that he is a tough guy – note the Osama bin Laden takedown – and I think he can be equally tough on Iran.
Even if we give Mitt Romney the benefit of the doubt he has plenty to learn. He was clumsy and somewhat ill-informed on this trip to Europe and the Middle East. His foreign-policy credentials are of course thin and we cannot wait too long for him to fatten them up.
Thank You Bob Costas for Remembering the Tragic Munich Olympics
Bob Costas asked the International Olympic Committee to have a moment of silence in memory of the slain Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics. The IOC rejected the request offering the usual argument about not wanting to politicize the games, a standard they do not always hold themselves to. Costas, who should be commended for his courage and dignity, told the IOC that he was going to remember the moment anyway and is planning something for the opening ceremony.
I think this issue is important and worthy of some commentary. One of the problems with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that nothing seems to transcend the rank politics of the conflict. If I wrote a high-minded defense of Costas and thought that this tragedy deserved cultural and historical recognition most would simply dismiss it and categorize me as “another Israel supporter.” And the converse is true for those who might deny the request for recognition. They would be cavalierly cast as anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian. The consequence of this constant simplistic bifurcation of the conflict is that it becomes impossible to talk about anything else. This is certainly true of any notion of “truth.” One cannot even report in a straightforward descriptive manner what actually occurred during some political event. Everything is steeped in interpretive implications, and combine this with facile notions of the “social construction of reality” and nothing is what it seems. This is essentially the situation with contemporary American politics and the Tea Party. They are so concerned with ideological and political purity that any other form of talk resulting in true deliberation – the kind of deliberation where one side might actually learn something and adjust their opinions – is impossible.
But isn’t it possible to ask what sort of political act is actually deserving of memory and recognition. Isn’t it possible, regardless of what side of the political spectrum you occupy, to condemn group specific murder as unacceptable? Isn’t it possible for the Olympic Games, with its long history of fellowship and cultural cooperation to stand up for something as clearly odious as targeted murder of an ethnopolitical group within the context of the games? The killing of the Israeli athletes was not a disembodied violent act but one that was wrapped in Olympic significance.
The tragedy of the Munich Olympics, along with its enduring images, is truly a cultural collective memory that endures because of the kinship that surrounds participation in the Olympics. It is true enough that we construct our pasts with contemporary culture in mind but that is what simply keeps a historical occurrence alive with fresh meaning and relevant meaning.
There is a relationship between tragedy and historical meaning. A tragedy always connects culture, the social, and the visual physiological environment. And, perhaps more importantly, tragedy binds individuals to groups and community. Consequently, the events of the Munich Olympics have bound individual and groups and infused their membership in these groups with significance, a significance that sweeps through time and becomes part of history.
It’s important to commemorate and remember the horrific violence of the 1972 Munich Olympics because it has become a collective memory signifying the full sweep of political consciousness and conflict. Collective memories define group identities and signal people as to their individual identities. Remembering the Munich tragedy should prompt people to ask themselves who they are and what they will accept.
We should remember that there is competition for what is recalled and remembered in the past. Disagreements about remembering events are always hotly contested and one version of the story “wins out” over another and thus becomes a more dominant theme along with changing the historical story. Historical events that were once considered objectively, or as objectively as possible, become pawns in a game designed to manage the perception of reality. Memories and proper understanding of events are most contested and manipulated during periods of confusion and uncertainty. We are currently struggling with understanding political conflicts, anti-Semitism, nationalist struggles, and how to reconcile history with contemporary circumstances. This is especially true for the prototypical intractable conflict that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It is sometimes said that the past is manipulated in order to fashion the present. If that were true, why wouldn’t we want to recognize the horrific events of the 1972 Olympics in order to inform and sensitize the present?
Islam and Political Correctness
Below is some terminology from: www.sfcg.org. It is a sort of political correctness guide but I’m curious about distortions and loss of meaning. What do you think? Below is an analysis of one term “Islamic terrorism.” Other terms are listed along the right side. Is this sort of sensitivity justified or does the phrase “Islamic terrorism” accurately capture what it is you want to say. I will post more of these on occasion.
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Additional Distinctions
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The Question Everyone Asked Me in Israel
I just returned from teaching and collecting data in Israel for 2 1/2 months. I had a fine time working with Israeli students and engaging in various academic projects of my own. Interestingly, every nonacademic Israeli (the average person on the streets or in the bars), after the usual preliminaries, asked me the same question: “Why does the world, they asked, pay so much attention to us and why do they hate us so much?” Most Israelis just don’t understand the animosity directed at them. They don’t understand how places like Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Zimbabwe float by with relatively little attention but Israel, a successful free-market democracy, is the brunt of so much criticism.
I typically began the discussion with lots of explanations including the amount of news that came out of Israel because it was an open democracy and you could file a story easily, the cachet of the holy land, the successful portrayal of the Palestinians as “oppressed,” and a variety of other explanations that are not my main concern at the moment. I also often made reference to the power of anti-Semitism by pointing out ironically that the Jews were hated historically when there are weak, and isn’t it interesting that they are still hated now that they are strong. What does that tell you?
But the question of blame in Israel is particularly interesting. Part of Israel’s current crisis is a “crisis of blame.” The second intifada was blamed on Israel. All Israeli security concerns result in blame as the Palestinians are described as largely defenseless. The controversial book by Peter Beinart is a litany of blame targeting Israel and there are a number of places, as Daniel Gordis has pointed out, where Beinart is simply wrong and does not have his facts straight. What is even more insidious is how politically incorrect it has become to credit Israel. Nobody ever mentions the extraordinary number of cultural and artistic alliances between Jews and Arabs in Israeli society. Nobody mentions Israel’s coordination with the Palestinians with respect to development and medical issues. Israel always seems to be spoken of in cold detached language while Palestinian problems garner tremendous emotion.
So this question of why Israel receives so much international attention and condemnation, why they get so much blame, remains an enigma. Israel has gone from holding the moral high ground while it made the desert bloom to a pariah nation. The answer to the problem of blaming Israel is of course complex but it has one component that is clear. It is the problem of liberalism that rejects any sort of ethnic nationalism and believes it to be a remnant of old world tribalism. Moreover, liberalism has come full circle toward an inability to take a stand on many things – to get in the ring and punch for what it believes in. To paraphrase Barack Obama “the arc of justice is long but it bends toward democracy and freedom.” That is to say, as rigid and authoritarian political polities move to the future they will look more like Israel. Their economies and their individual freedoms will be more pronounced. They will bend toward Israel.
Israelis want one thing. When the day comes that this conflict ends, when all the borders are established and the streets are named, they want there to be standing a Jewish state. A state devoted to Jewish particularity. Not a Torah state, not another Iran, but a state devoted to Jewish history, culture, art, literature, and politics. Israeli bashing seems to be an effort to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state, an effort to thoroughly delegitimize Israel. And this is one reason Netanyahu always demands during peace processes that the PLA recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
Peace and Conflict Politics 